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Foreword
Proposals to temporarily extend unemployment benefits 
have been considered during every recession since World 
War II. The Federal Supplemental Benefits (FSB) program 
of 1974 has so far been the largest and most costly of these 
programs. This analysis and evaluation of the FSB program 
addresses policy issues currently under discussion in regard 
to the rationale for and performance of such emergency ex 
tensions.
In examining both the specific FSB program and the more 
general question of whether benefits should be extended dur 
ing recessions, the authors explore a number of approaches 
to estimating social benefits and costs. They recommend a 
cautious approach to emergency extension policies, sug 
gesting that such programs be considered only during 
especially severe recessions.
Facts and observations presented in this study are the sole 
responsibility of the authors. Their viewpoints do not 
necessarily represent positions of the W. E. Upjohn Institute 
for Employment Research.
E. Earl Wright 
Director
Kalamazoo, Michigan 
February 1982
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I. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY
A. Introduction
Prior to the 1979-80 recession, Congress had temporarily 
extended the duration for which individuals were allowed to 
collect unemployment insurance (UI) benefits in every major 
recession since the 1950s. In 1970, Congress established a 
permanent standby program of extended benefits (EB) that 
automatically become payable during periods of high 
unemployment. Specifically, during periods when particular 
measures of the insured unemployment rate exceed certain 
levels, the EB program increases the maximum duration for 
UI benefits (including benefits payable under the regular 
state program) from approximately 26 to 39 weeks. In the 
recession of the early 1970s, Congress provided an additional 
emergency extension (beyond EB) that increased the max 
imum duration to 52 weeks. Later, during the recession of 
the mid 1970s, Congress adopted emergency extensions 
under the Federal Supplemental Benefits (FSB) program. 
That program increased the maximum number of weeks for 
which individuals could collect benefits from 39 to as high as 
52 or 65 weeks. Although it was proposed, Congress did not 
adopt a temporary emergency extension during the high 
unemployment period that began in late 1979.
This paper evaluates the overall performance of the FSB 
program and provides a general framework for future con 
sideration of emergency supplemental benefits programs. It
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concludes that the desirability of such programs is ques 
tionable. On the one hand, emergency extensions satisfy a 
number of needs that existing policies are unable to meet. 
For example, they provide increased unemployment protec 
tion to workers, and temporarily maintain the income of 
those individuals who have exhausted their regular UI and 
EB entitlements. On the other hand, such extensions are in 
evitably costly because benefits are typically extended in an 
all-inclusive "shotgun" fashion and may provide substantial 
work disincentives. It appears then, that with the exception 
of severe recessions, emergency extensions of the FSB-type 
should be used but sparingly. Existing regular UI and 
benefits payable under the permanent EB program should 
remain the primary means for meeting the needs of the 
unemployed.
B. Outline of the Paper
The remainder of this paper is divided into five chapters. 
Chapter II provides a brief historical summary of legislation 
concerning unemployment benefits duration. It stresses the 
expanding federal role in such policies and points out the 
assumptions generally believed to have prompted this expan 
sion. Chapter III briefly describes the characteristics and 
labor market experiences of individuals who collected 
benefits under FSB. Chapter IV discusses the general alloca- 
tional effects of extended benefits programs and examines 
the specific effects of the FSB program for example, 
whether FSB encouraged individuals to remain unemployed 
longer and how well it maintained aggregate purchasing 
power during the recession. Chapter V considers the 
distributional impact of FSB by examining how well it com 
pensated workers for their recession-induced unemployment 
and whether it prevented poverty among the lowest income
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FSB recipients. How FSB relates to existing and proposed 
welfare programs is also considered. Finally, chapter VI pro 
vides an overall assessment of FSB (and emergency extended 
benefits programs in general) by addressing seven basic ques 
tions that policy makers will have to answer in future reces 
sions. A brief discussion of alternative policies during reces 
sions is also included.
C. Summary of Findings
Because this paper is itself a summary of more extensive 
research on extended benefits programs, it is impossible to 
mention all of the issues examined in that research. 
However, some of the major themes, more fully detailed in 
this paper, are briefly summarized below. First, with respect 
to the legislative history of UI benefit duration provisions, 
the following points are noted:
  The debate over the ideal duration of UI benefits is 
long-standing. Disagreement still exists over how the in 
creased benefits provided by longer UI durations should 
be traded off against any work disincentives they may 
cause.
  There is general agreement that the distinction between 
an "earned right" to unemployment insurance and an 
income maintenance rationale for benefits becomes less 
clear as longer UI durations are considered.
  The provision of emergency extended benefits is increas 
ingly regarded as one aspect of an overall federal man 
date to provide macroeconomic stability.
  Enactment of the permanent extended benefits (EB) 
program in 1970 marked the first time UI legislation
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provided an automatic activation of extended benefits 
during recessions.
Examination of FSB recipients© characteristics and labor 
market experiences in chapter III shows:
  FSB recipients were more likely to be women and more 
likely to be older than other groups of unemployed in 
dividuals during the 1974-75 recession. This result stems 
partly from lower UI eligibility rates among younger 
workers. It may also have been the result of weaker 
alternative economic opportunities for women and 
older workers.
  FSB recipients had, in general, a long record of employ 
ment, having worked an average of 17 years, including 5 
years at the job held prior to receiving UI benefits.
  Following the layoff that led to FSB, recipients were 
unemployed for a substantial length of time, an average 
of 61 weeks during their first completed spell. Three- 
quarters of these unemployment spells ended in 
reemployment.
  At a point approximately three years after the initial 
layoff, 57 percent of FSB recipients were reemployed, 
with males and younger individuals having relatively 
greater success in finding work. Real weekly wages on 
these jobs had, however, fallen by about 10 percent 
relative to wages on the pre-UI job; nearly one-third of 
all reemployed individuals experienced a reduction in 
real weekly wages of 25 percent or more. These declines 
in weekly wages were about equally attributable to 
decreases in hours worked and decreases in hourly wage 
rates.
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Among the more important allocational aspects of extended 
benefits programs examined in chapter IV are the following:
  Extended benefits programs appear to contain work 
disincentives stemming from the increased unemploy 
ment durations they provide. There is disagreement, 
however, over the exact size of those effects. Some 
estimates suggest that FSB added about 0.5 percent to 
the unemployment rate during the mid 1970s.
  The connection, if any, between extended benefits and 
the job search behavior of recipients has not yet been 
well researched.
  Extended benefits programs may provide some degree 
of macroeconomic stabilization during recessions. 
However, evidence from the FSB program shows that 
such effects are probably small relative to other 
stabilization policy initiatives such as automatic and 
discretionary tax cuts, and that extended UI benefits 
programs may, of necessity, lag in their impact on the 
economy.
Chapter V discusses the following income distributional 
arguments for extended benefits programs:
  The permanent EB program may be sufficient to keep 
the percentage of claimants who exhaust their benefits 
within acceptable bounds during mild recessions. It ap 
pears that during the mid 1970s FSB reduced exhaustion 
rates to well below their pre-recession levels.
  To hold the earnings replacement rate (total benefits 
paid divided by lost after-tax earnings) constant as 
unemployment rates fluctuate, UI duration should be
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extended by 3.5 to 5.1 weeks for each 1 percentage point 
increase in the insured unemployment rate. The perma 
nent EB program is sufficient to hold earnings replace 
ment rates constant during most recessions.
  Antipoverty arguments for UI extensions assume that 
alternative income maintenance programs do not pro 
vide adequate support for UI exhaustees and the need 
for income support by exhaustees is greater during 
recessionary periods. Evidence from the recession of the 
mid 1970s supports both assumptions, although the 
evidence concerning the second assumption is weak.
  The FSB program had a substantial antipoverty effect, 
but substantial benefits went to the nonpoor as well. 
That is, FSB was "target inefficient."
Policy questions concerning UI extensions during future 
recessions are addressed in chapter VI. Some of the 
highlights are:
  It is argued that an FSB-type program is not needed dur 
ing mild recessions because the EB program is sufficient 
to keep exhaustion rates from rising and earnings 
replacement rates from falling during such times. Fur 
thermore, the EB program provides breathing space be 
tween the start of a recession and the time when further 
extensions might be needed, which allows policy makers 
time to assess the severity of a recession and, conse 
quently, the need for FSB.
  Insurance arguments for FSB suggest that potential 
duration should be increased about 3.5 to 5.1 weeks for 
every 1 percentage point rise in the insured unemploy 
ment rate above the level necessitating the EB program.
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Income maintenance arguments for FSB weakly support 
extensions in the upper part of this range.
  Few options help policy makers mitigate the disincentive 
effects of extensions. Eligibility restrictions related to 
the amount of past work experience would have almost 
no effect on recipient characteristics and post-UI labor 
market activities. But stiffer job search and job accep 
tance requirements might have some effect by reducing 
eligibility for certain groups of workers.
  Several options allow policy makers to target unemploy 
ment benefits on the poor, although some of them 
would be administratively difficult. Use of an income 
eligibility screen appears to be the easiest, most effective 
way to achieve this potential program goal.
  Analysis of the recipients© experiences under the FSB 
program provides little guidance for improving job 
search outcomes. The availability of employment and 
training services had few effects.
  Future FSB programs should be financed from general 
revenues, thereby treating FSB as a countercyclical pro 
gram and emphasizing that national recessions are a 
federal responsibility.
  A more generous welfare system would reduce the need 
for FSB as an antipoverty tool. However, an additional 
antipoverty effect would be achieved with UI exten 
sions. Income-testing of unemployment assistance 
benefits for regular UI and EB exhaustees (as recom 
mended by the National Commission on Unemploy 
ment Compensation) would reduce the costs involved in 
reaching that goal.
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  Other programs such as a countercyclical public service 
employment program for UI exhaustees would also 
mitigate the need for extensions, but they would 
probably be only a partial substitute during periods 
when emergency UI extensions were judged necessary.
II. A HISTORY OF UI DURATION 
LEGISLATION
A. Introduction
Legislators most often take a piecemeal approach to 
amending social policies, making numerous changes as ex 
perience accumulates. UI has been no exception, particularly 
with regard to duration policy for unemployment benefits. 
Since the onset of the program, the maximum duration of 
benefit payments has undergone a sporadic yet continual 
process of extension, with first the states and then the federal 
government taking the lead. Although the process has been 
uneven, several basic objectives have continued to concern 
legislators and to influence legislation. This chapter will 
survey these general influences. Three sections provide a 
chronological history of the duration debate and the 
legislative changes it brought about. Section B summarizes 
pre-World War II experience; section C examines the evolu 
tion of duration provisions during the 1950s and 1960s; and 
section D covers the 1970s. Following this brief historical 
review, we consider two general questions that have influenc 
ed duration since the establishment of the UI system: (1) 
What indicators are appropriate for judging the adequacy of 
duration provisions (section E)? and (2) How should deci 
sions on duration reflect the distinction between UI and 
welfare (section F)? Each of these concerns will be analyzed 
in detail. Later chapters will then emphasize their relevance 
to FSB-type programs. Finally, section G provides a brief 
conclusion to the chapter.
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B. Early History
The early writings on unemployment insurance established 
three basic program objectives:
(1) insurance against personal income loss for individual 
workers;
(2) aggregate income maintenance in the general 
economy; and
(3) employment stabilization for firms.
At first, the accomplishment of these objectives was limited 
because of a relatively narrow view of what an unemploy 
ment compensation program should be. The program was 
designed to provide only a "first line of defense" for the or 
dinarily steadily employed. 1 This belief was emphasized by 
Arthur Altmeyer, then chairman of the Social Security 
Board.
The purpose of Unemployment Compensation is to 
provide some minimum protection when those per 
sons who are ordinarily employed become 
unemployed. It is not relief nor is it intended to 
meet all unemployment under all conditions. The 
prime objective of Unemployment Compensation 
is to provide benefits to persons who become 
unemployed in normal times due to the ordinary 
changes in business conditions and also to provide 
the first line of defense during periods of unusual 
unemployment and severe business depression. 2
1. U.S. Committee on Economic Security report to the President, 1935.
2. Hearing on HR 6635, Senate Finance Committee, 76th Congress, first session, 1939.
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Accordingly, the duration of benefits was strictly limited 
at the program©s outset.
Unemployment Insurance cannot give complete 
and unlimited compensation to all who are 
unemployed. Any attempt to make it do so con 
fuses Unemployment Insurance with relief, which it 
is designed to replace in large part. It can give com 
pensation only for a limited period and for a 
percentage of the wage loss. 3
It seems reasonable to ask why an unemployed worker is 
not covered for the entire spell of unemployment, provided 
that he or she is actively looking for work and does not turn 
down any suitable job offers. Initially, there were two 
reasons for the limit on benefit duration. First was the fear 
of high costs to the system.
Coming to the concept of Unemployment Compen 
sation, we regard it as merely a measure to give 
limited benefits to employees during a period while 
they have a reasonable opportunity to be taken 
back within a short time in their old positions. 
Unemployment Compensation, if it is not to be 
mere relief, must be based on the contributions that 
are received. Unless the contribution rates are ex 
tremely high, the period during which compensa 
tion can be paid will necessarily be quite limited.... 
Unemployment Compensation as we conceive it is 
something that the man should get in cash during 
such a period as can be paid for by the contribu 
tions. 4
3. House Report No. 615, 74th Congress, first session, 1935.
4. Hearings before the Senate Committee on Finance, 1936.
"Statement of Professor Witte, Executive Director of the Committee on Economic Securi 
ty."
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These fears were reinforced by overcautious actuarial 
estimates of the maximum number of weeks of benefits that 
could be paid for a given contribution rate and waiting 
period. On the basis of the 1922-1933 statistics, the staff of 
the Committee on Economic Security estimated that a 3 per 
cent contribution rate could finance only eight weeks of 
benefits with a two-week waiting period, and only ten weeks 
of benefits with a four-week waiting period. Using the 
1922-1930 estimates for a 3 percent contribution rate, it 
estimated that twelve weeks of benefits could be paid with a 
four-week waiting period. 5
The second reason for limiting the duration of benefits 
was fear that unemployment benefits posed "economic 
risks" to the community (Burns, 1949). The payment of 
unemployment benefits allows the beneficiary to "hold out" 
for the type of employment to which he or she is accustomed 
and which is at a wage rate that is "reasonable" (presumably 
near or equal to that of the previous job). Hence, it may be 
the case that unemployment benefit payments will permit 
postponing what may be desirable economic readjustments 
when viewed by the community as a whole. On the other 
hand, it is undesirable for the community to force an 
unemployed worker to accept the first employment oppor 
tunity regardless of its nature. There was, therefore, the 
sense that a healthy economy required having "the right man 
on the right job" (Clague, 1949).
The maximum duration of benefits then, involved a com 
promise between the interests of society as a whole and those 
of unemployed workers. It was argued that maximum dura 
tion provisions should only provide for a reasonable period 
during which an unemployed worker would look for suitable
5. For both estimates the weekly benefit amount was assumed equal to half the prior weekly 
wage.
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employment, and after which the economic risks to the com 
munity were too great. This concern was voiced in the first 
session of the 74th Congress (1935):
In normal times it [unemployment compensation] 
will enable most workers who lose their jobs to tide 
themselves over until they get back to their old 
work or find other employment without having to 
resort to relief. Even in depression it will cover a 
considerable part of all unemployment and will be 
all that many workers will need. Unemployed 
workmen who cannot find other employment 
within a reasonable period will have to be cared for 
through work relief or other forms of assistance. 6
C. Evolution of Duration Provisions in the 
Post-War Period
These two considerations (high costs and economic risks) 
together with the desire not to make unemployment compen 
sation a relief program resulted in conservative duration 
maximums. By 1938 only six states provided a maximum 
benefit duration of more than 16 weeks. In addition, the 
precise duration for each individual worker was further 
limited, in all states (except Ohio), through provisions allow 
ing workers to draw benefits totaling only a small fraction of 
their earnings during a specified previous base period.
The conservative limits on overall duration maximums 
and the equally conservative limits on individual entitlements 
meant that unemployment compensation would cover only a 
small portion of the earnings losses of unemployed workers. 
Although there was discussion of extending benefits for cer-
6. House Report No. 615, 74th Congress, first session, 1935.
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tain classes of workers, there was no consideration of alter 
ing durations to meet general economic circumstances. Dur 
ing World War II and through most of the 1950s, economic 
activity was at a high level and unemployment insurance 
claims were lower than anticipated. State unemployment in 
surance funds rose, and it became clear that the earlier ac 
tuarial predictions had been far too cautious and that 
benefits could be paid for longer periods (and waiting weeks 
reduced). As a result, many states began to liberalize their 
benefit duration provisions: the average period over which 
benefits could be received rose from 13-14 weeks in 1941 to 
21 weeks by 1952. The increase in the maximum duration of 
benefits continued through the 1950s in the "absence of any 
clear norms governing the process" (Becker, 1965). By the 
late 1950s, most states had adopted a maximum duration of 
26 weeks and several states had started to experiment with 
even longer durations.
Although there were two recessions in the immediate post 
war period (in 1949 and 1954), it was not until the severe 
recession of 1958 that benefits beyond those called for under 
regular state programs were made available. In that year, ex 
tended UI benefits were provided under the Temporary 
Unemployment Compensation Act (TUC) in states that 
chose to accept the program. Not all states participated in 
the program, although some nonparticipants chose to imple 
ment extended benefits programs of their own. TUC benefits 
were funded by repayable "advances" from the federal 
unemployment insurance trust funds which were ultimately 
repaid by the participating states. The TUC program provid 
ed one additional week of benefits for every two weeks of an 
individual©s original UI entitlement. All later UI benefit ex 
tension programs have followed a similar formula by defin 
ing the number of weeks of extended benefits to be some 
fraction of an individual©s regular UI entitlement (a max-
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imum in the total number of weeks of benefits that can be 
collected has also been added to the formula). The variability 
in the regular UI duration provisions of states has therefore 
been adopted into extended benefits policy as well.
A second extended UI benefits emergency program was 
proposed by President Kennedy in the wake of the steep 
economic downturn in early 1961. This program, adopted as 
the Temporary Extended Unemployment Compensation Act 
(TEUC) was broadly similar to the earlier (1958) TUC law. 
The major differences were that the TEUC program was 
mandatory for all states and benefits were funded through 
an increase in the federal unemployment tax. 7 Benefit 
payments continued to be made through the state programs, 
however, with state laws determining weekly benefit 
amounts and eligibility and disqualification provisions. In 
volvement of the federal government in financing the TEUC 
program established the precedent of the federal govern 
ment©s taking the initiative in extended unemployment 
benefits policy and since that time most such policy has 
originated at the federal level.
D. Extended Benefits Policy in the 1970s
Experiences with the emergency temporary extended 
benefits programs of the late 1950s and early 1960s led to the 
recognition of a need for a more automatic policy response 
to recessionary circumstances. After several abortive at 
tempts at establishing such a policy in the mid 1960s, that 
need was formally recognized with passage of the Employ 
ment Security Amendments of 1970, under which a perma 
nent program of federal and state (50-50) financed extended 
benefits (EB) would come into effect during periods of high
7. Prior to the TEUC program, several states had adopted extended benefits provisions in 
their own UI laws. Such state extensions were generally subsumed under TEUC.
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unemployment. As with the earlier temporary extension pro 
grams, provisions of the EB program allow each claimant to 
draw additional benefits during such periods up to half of his 
or her regular UI entitlement, but not for more than 13 add 
ed weeks nor for more than 39 weeks in all. For states in 
which regular benefits can exceed 26 weeks, the state is reim 
bursed by the federal government for half the costs of 
regular benefits paid beyond the 26th week during the EB 
period. The federal share of EB costs is financed from 
Federal Unemployment Tax revenues and the state share by 
state UI reserves. These regular extended benefits are 
automatically "triggered" whenever the insured unemploy 
ment rate (IUR) averages 4.5 percent nationally during a 
13-week period or when the 13-week average IUR in a state 
equals at least 4 percent and at least 120 percent of the 
average of the IUR in the corresponding period in the two 
previous years. 8 Dissatisfaction with the 120 percent provi 
sion of the specific trigger formula has caused it to be 
suspended temporarily several times. Because of these ex 
periences, states are now permitted to waive the 120 percent 
requirement if the 13-week state IUR equals or exceeds 5 per 
cent.
There were two temporary emergency extensions of 
benefits beyond EB during the 1970s. Both were entirely 
federally financed. The first was enacted in 1971 as the 
Emergency Unemployment Compensation Act of that year. 
Under that program a maximum of 13 additional weeks of 
benefits was payable in states with very high unemployment 
rates. 9 Originally scheduled to expire in September 1972, the 
program was continued until March 30, 1973.
8. In computing these trigger rates, national data are seasonally adjusted, whereas state 
data are not.
9. Because the trigger formula for this emergency program differed from the one used in 
the regular EB program, the recession of the early 1970s was characterized by the confusing 
situation that states could have no program of extended benefits, could offer only EB, 
could offer only the emergency program, or could offer both programs.
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It is the second emergency extension of the 1970s, the 
Federal Supplemental Benefits (FSB) program, that provides 
the focus of this report. As originally enacted in December 
1974 (as part of the Emergency Unemployment Compensa 
tion Act of 1974), FSB provided for up to 13 additional 
weeks of benefits to individuals who had exhausted their EB 
entitlements (up to 52 weeks in all). As with EB, a claimant©s 
actual entitlement under FSB was set at one half his or her 
regular UI entitlement. An additional 13-week tier (or 
another 50 percent of the regular UI entitlement) of FSB 
benefits was added in March of 1975. This increase entitled 
individuals to collect up to 65 total weeks of UI benefits 26 
from the regular state UI program, 13 from the EB program 
and 26 from FSB (or up to 2.5 times their regular UI entitle 
ment if that was less). With these provisions, FSB 
represented the longest duration for UI benefits in the 
history of the program. 10
Two further amendments to FSB had the effect of scaling 
back the program somewhat. PL 94-45 specified that as of 
January 1,1976, the maximum duration available under FSB 
would be a function of the average 13-week insured 
unemployment rate in each state with an average above 6 
percent being required in order to be eligible for up to the 
full 26-week FSB entitlement. FSB came to resemble the EB 
program in the sense that it was triggered on (and off) in 
phases, depending on a state©s labor market conditions. In 
later chapters we develop criteria by which to assess whether 
these various trigger indicators were set at appropriate levels.
The final major amendments to FSB took effect in April 
1977 under PL 95-19. These had two important effects. 
First, they eliminated the second tier of FSB, thereby reduc-
10. Initially, FSB was financed as a charge on Federal Unemployment Tax revenues. After 
March 1977, it was financed by general revenues.
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ing the maximum FSB entitlement to 13 weeks in states that 
met certain trigger requirements, and they provided for the 
ultimate phaseout of the FSB program in early 1978. Second, 
and perhaps more important, the amendments mandated, 
for the first time, that certain uniform federal eligibility and 
disqualification standards would apply to FSB recipients. 
The previous practice had been to use existing state stan 
dards. The federal standards were generally more stringent 
than the corresponding state standards and were enacted in 
part because of congressional desire to "tighten-up" the FSB 
program. The provisions seem to have had that effect, since 
FSB denials increased sharply following implementation of 
the new standards, and apparently many FSB claimants 
stopped filing on their own once they learned of the new re 
quirements.
Overall then, the 1970s experienced major changes in ex 
tended UI benefits policy. The EB program was established 
as a permanent, automatic UI policy response to recessions, 
and a variety of emergency legislation was enacted that pro 
vided further temporary extensions. In the recession of 
1979-1980, the EB program also came into effect in many 
states and, for a while, on a national basis, although after 
considerable congressional debate no emergency extension 
program was enacted. Before turning to a substantive ex 
amination of the most important piece of emergency legisla 
tion during the 1970s (the FSB program), it may be helpful to 
provide a brief review of some major policy issues that have 
characterized virtually every debate over emergency benefit 
extensions.
£. Indicators for Legislative Action: Unemployment 
and Exhaustion Rates
Certain regularities are apparent in the legislative debates 
about emergency extensions of UI benefit durations. We will
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focus on two: indicators of the need for extended benefits, 
and the relationship between UI and welfare. With respect to 
the first, there is general agreement on the kinds of economic 
indicators that tend to signal the need for emergency action 
on extended benefits. Throughout the post-World War II 
period, three macroeconomic variables have played an im 
portant role in influencing legislative decisions: the overall 
unemployment rate, the mean (or median) duration of 
unemployment spells, and the exhaustion rate for regular 
UI. Table II. 1 shows that these three measures are closely 
related for the 1953-1978 period. 11 Quarterly data on the me 
dian duration of unemployment spells and the exhaustion 
rate for regular UI were used as dependent variables in sim 
ple regressions run with the overall unemployment rate as the 
sole explanatory variable. These simple regressions explained 
the variance of the dependent variable quite well 85 percent 
of the variance in spell durations and 92 percent of the 
variance in exhaustion rates were explained by a single 
measure of labor market tightness the overall unemploy 
ment rate. More specifically, the results show that each 1 
percentage point increase in the unemployment rate tends to 
be correlated with a nearly one-week (0.93) increase in the 
length of the median unemployment spell. Since the national 
unemployment rate increases by 2 or 3 percentage points 
during a "typical" economic downturn, these results in 
dicate that the median worker is unemployed about two or 
three weeks longer during such periods. The incidence of 
relatively long unemployment spells also increases commen- 
surately. Table II. 1 also shows that higher unemployment 
rates are associated with higher rates of regular UI benefit 
exhaustion. On average, each 1 percentage point rise in the 
unemployment rate tends to be associated with a 4.4 per 
centage point increase in the exhaustion rate. Therefore, ex-
11. Underlying data on these variables for the 1974-77 period are provided in tables V. 1 and 
V.2.
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haustion rates for regular UI might rise by about 9 to 13 
percentage points (say from 25 to 35+ percent) during a 
typical downturn. Each of these empirical regularities has 
been reflected in legislative debates.
TABLE II.l
Effect of Unemployment Rate on Duration
of Unemployment Spell and UI Exhaustion Rate
United States, 1953-1978a
Independent Variable________Dependent Variables______
Measure of Effect of Median Duration of Exhaustion Rate 
Unemployment Rateb Unemployment Spell for Regular UI
Coefficient 
(t statistic)
Constant 
(t statistic)
R2
Standard Error
F-Statistic
Durbin Watson Statistic
0.934 
(9.692)
-0.060 
(-0.108)
.847
0.697
108.157
2.11
4.42 
(11.493)
6.13 
(3.740)
.922
.028
148.147
2.077
a. Sources of the data underlying these measures are Unemployment Insurance Statistics 
(various issues) for the exhaustion rate series and Employment and Earnings (various 
issues) for the other data, 
b. Seasonally adjusted quarterly rates.
The connection between rising unemployment and 
lengthening unemployment spells was clearly reflected by 
Secretary of Labor John T. Dunlop©s statement before the 
Senate Finance Committee in 1975:
I do think that it is appropriate that the duration 
should rise in times of very heavy unemployment.
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The reason for that principle, I think is this: the job 
search which takes place in a labor market may 
take a lot longer, and one may have to travel a lot 
further in times in which unemployment levels are 
appreciably higher. So, the notion of expanding the 
benefits, with the level of unemployment is, on the 
whole, a sound principle. 12
The concern over longer unemployment spells during 
periods of high unemployment also leads naturally to con 
sideration of UI exhaustion rates. If, in times of high 
unemployment, benefit duration should increase to provide 
"adequate" coverage for those workers whose unemploy 
ment spells lengthen, the exhaustion rate is then a "test" by 
which the adequacy of benefit durations might be judged. In 
1958, for example, President Eisenhower, in a message to 
Congress, called for legislation extending benefits for those 
workers who had exhausted their regular benefits. In 
reference to the President©s remarks, Secretary of Labor 
James P. Mitchell stated in Senate hearings before the 
Finance Committee:
The President©s recommendation for this tem 
porary legislation was based on the fact not only 
that unemployment increased sharply after the first 
of the year and rose to heights far above normal, 
but also that the rate at which unemployed workers 
were exhausting their unemployment insurance 
benefits and still remained unemployed was sharply 
increasing in many areas. 13
The belief of the founders of the unemployment insurance 
system that the duration of benefits should be sufficient to
12. Senate Hearings (Finance Committee) 94th Congress, first session, June 197S.
13. Senate Hearings (Finance Committee) 85th Congress, second session, 19S8.
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insure protection through temporary periods of 
unemployment has generally been interpreted to mean "a 
duration sufficient to enable the majority or the ©great ma 
jority* of insured workers to find suitable work before ex 
hausting their benefit rights." 14 Although there has been lit 
tle explicit agreement as to what the "great majority" of 
workers should mean, in practice the notion has been widely 
held that total exhaustion rates for all UI benefits (including 
extensions) should not rise precipitously during recessions. 
In chapters IV and V we will examine the connection be 
tween the length of unemployment spells, exhaustion rates, 
and UI extensions in considerably more detail, and the em 
pirical results indicated in table II. 1 will provide some useful 
rules of thumb for discussing policy alternatives.
F. Unemployment Insurance and Welfare
Another recurrent issue in the legislative debate over ex 
tensions in UI duration is differentiating between an 
unemployment insurance and a welfare rationale for com 
pensating individuals with very long unemployment spells. 
The link between the insurable risk of unemployment and 
the cause of the present unemployment becomes unclear dur 
ing longer spells. Several observers have suggested that after 
a worker has exhausted a certain number of weeks of 
benefits, he or she should no longer be the responsibility of 
the unemployment insurance system but should instead 
become the responsibility of the welfare system. In some 
European countries, for example, income-tested welfare 
payments automatically become payable after exhaustion of 
regular unemployment insurance benefits. Recent proposals 
in this country have suggested similar arrangements, or have 
at least attempted to define more clearly a workable relation-
14. "The Role of Unemployment Resources Today . . . And Tomorrow," Employment 
Security Review, August 1962, p. 33.
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ship between unemployment insurance and income 
maintenance programs. Former Secretary of Labor Dunlop, 
in the same statement in which he advocated increasing 
benefit durations during the 1974-75 recession, also spoke of 
the need to limit the extensions:
I cannot tell you where my ideal limit is. I, myself, 
am concerned . . . about our system degenerating 
into what I call a public assistance program. ... I 
do favor this extension at this time because we have 
not in this country placed into effect a comprehen 
sive type of welfare program; [Another] solution to 
these two problems would say after a certain point 
a person who was unemployed I do not care for 
the moment whether you say 52 weeks, 65 weeks, 
78 weeks, or some other number ought to be 
treated financially not as part of the unemployment 
insurance system, financed in the way an 
unemployment insurance system is, but ought to be 
treated as a part of some welfare program. 15
Dunlop went on to speak of the very same "economic risks" 
that were responsible for the limits on the duration of 
benefits at the outset of the UI program. He noted that 
unemployment durations of 52 weeks or more may be due to 
some structural factor in the community and/or industry 
that would result in the lost jobs never again becoming 
available. In such circumstances, direct income support may 
be more appropriate than continuing unemployment in 
surance benefits.
Debate over the connection between UI extensions and 
public assistance continues to this day. Two general ques-
15. Senate Hearings (Finance Committee) 94th Congress, first session, June 197S.
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tions have characterized more recent discussions of the sub 
ject: (1) whether extended UI benefits should be subject to 
some type of means test; and (2) how extensions should be 
financed. Although there has been considerable analysis of 
the first question (and we take up the issue in detail in 
chapter V), it has received only slight attention in legislative 
debate. Emergency extensions have usually been enacted 
quite rapidly leaving little time for a full airing of the means- 
testing issue. There have been, however, some changes in the 
financing arrangements considered appropriate for emergen 
cy extensions. After March 1977, FSB benefits were financed 
through general revenues and this represented the first 
departure from exclusive use of UI tax revenues for UI 
benefits. Implicit in this decision to finance FSB through 
general revenues was the recognition that such long term 
benefits should not be considered an appropriate financial 
responsibility of UI tax-paying employers within the tradi 
tional social insurance framework. Rather, payment of 
emergency extended benefits should be regarded as part of 
the more general responsibility of the federal government for 
macroeconomic activity.
G. Conclusion
This brief history of the legislative debate over UI dura 
tion provisions clearly illustrates two points. First, the 
debate is longstanding. Many of the basic issues addressed in 
the formative stages of the UI system remain as controversial 
today as they were then. What the duration of UI benefits 
should be and how that duration should be altered during 
recession is simply not agreed upon. Second, extended 
benefit policy has become increasingly a federal responsibili 
ty. As the federal government has taken a greater role in the 
maintenance of overall economic activity, it has come also to 
accept responsibility for initiating compensation programs,
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such as UI extensions. This is reflected both in the perma 
nent EB program (required in all states and half federally 
financed) that is automatically "triggered" during reces 
sions, and in the emergency programs that have been entirely 
federally financed and structured by federal policy makers. 
This increased responsibility at the federal level heightens the 
need to coordinate extended UI benefits policy with other 
federal programs.

III. LABOR MARKET EXPERIENCES AND 
CHARACTERISTICS OF FSB RECIPIENTS
A. Introduction
This chapter provides background information for our 
evaluation of the FSB program. It describes the demographic 
and pre-UI employment characteristics of FSB recipients, 
and it also describes their labor market experiences during 
and after receipt of UI benefits. Data for this chapter and 
much of the analysis reported in subsequent chapters were 
collected for a sample of FSB recipients in 15 selected states; 
the sample was chosen to represent the 2.8 million recipients 
who began collecting FSB during 1975. 1 Whenever possible, 
these recipients and their experiences were compared to other 
unemployed groups. These comparison groups included in 
dividuals who collected Extended Benefits and not FSB in 
1975, and long term unemployed individuals who had lost 
their jobs. 2
1. A complete description of this sample and more extensive analyses of the data can be 
found in Corson, et al. (1977) and Brewster, et al. (1978). The first of these reports was bas 
ed on data collected for a sample of 6,835 FSB recipients who were interviewed in March of 
1976. A second interview was conducted in November 1977 with a subsample of 1,522 of 
these individuals; this smaller sample was used for the second report. This chapter draws 
heavily on chapter II of the first report, which was written by Valeric Leach and on chapter 
II of the second report, which was written by Walter Nicholson.
2. EB recipient data were obtained from the same survey as the data for FSB recipients. 
Data for long term unemployed job losers were obtained from special tabulations from the 
March 1975 Current Population Survey.
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B. Demographic and Pre-UI Employment Charac 
teristics of FSB Recipients
Demographic Characteristics
Compared with EB recipients, or job losers who had been 
unemployed for 27 weeks or longer, FSB recipients were 
more likely to be female. Women accounted for 48 percent 
of FSB recipients, whereas less than 40 percent of the regular 
insured unemployed and of the long term unemployed job 
losers 3 and not quite 44 percent of EB recipients were female.
FSB recipients also tended to be older than other 
unemployed groups their mean age was 40 years, compared 
with a mean age of 36 for EB recipients, and 38 for job losers 
unemployed 27 weeks or more. Twenty-three percent of all 
FSB men and 21 percent of FSB women were 55 years old or 
older. These percentages were significantly higher than the 
analogous figures for EB recipients (13 percent of each sex 
group). 4 Older men also formed a larger proportion of the 
male FSB population than of male long term unemployed 
job losers.
The relatively higher incidence of women and of older 
workers among beneficiaries of extended unemployment in 
surance programs and among exhaustees of regular UI pro 
grams compared with other groups in the labor force also 
has been noted in other studies. 5 It stems partly from lower 
UI eligibility rates among younger workers and may also be 
due to weaker alternative economic opportunities for women 
and for older workers.
3. The long term unemployed are defined here as those who had been unemployed 27 weeks 
or longer. See table III.l.
4. Differences are termed significant in this chapter if they are statistically significant at the 
95 percent confidence level.
5. See, for example, Nicholson and Corson (1976).
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The proportions of white and nonwhite workers among 
female FSB recipients were the same as among female long 
term job losers. However, there was a higher proportion of 
whites among FSB males than among male long term job 
losers. This is partly due to the lower age of minority male 
workers, compared with their white counterparts, and to the 
lower UI eligibility rates of younger workers.
The education levels of FSB recipients were, on average, 
comparable with those of other groups unemployed for 27 
weeks or more. Over 60 percent of them had some high 
school education or had graduated from high school but had 
no further education. Levels of education, however, varied 
more among FSB recipients than among other comparison 
groups relatively more of them had no high school educa 
tion and a higher proportion of them had some college 
education. The contrast was greatest in comparison with EB 
recipients. This difference between EB and FSB recipients 
was associated with differences in their occupations and in 
dustries. As we show in the next section, proportionately 
more EB than FSB recipients were employed in manufactur 
ing industries, where employees tend to have some high 
school but no higher level of education.
Sixty-one percent of FSB recipients (65 percent of the 
women and 57 percent of the men) were married and headed, 
or shared responsibility for heading, their families; whereas 
only 49 percent of all long term unemployed job losers (55 
percent of the women and 45 percent of the men) were from 
husband-wife headed families. Almost one-third of the job 
loser group lived with but did not head their families, com 
pared with only 18 percent of FSB recipients. Among the 
men in the job loser and FSB recipient groups, the family 
nonhead proportions were 40 and 24 percent, respectively; 
among the women, they were 19 and 12 percent, respectively.
TABLE III.l u>O
Demographic Characteristics of FSB Recipients and 
Job Losers Unemployed 27 Weeks or More
FSB Recipients
Demographic Characteristic
Age
Under 25
25 -34
35-44
45-54
55 -64
65 and Older
Total
Mean Age
Race
White
Black and Other
Total
Education
Some Elementary School
Completed Elementary
School
Total
21.2%
25.3
15.4
16.3
13.5
8.3
100.0%
39.7
84.7%
15.2
100.0%
8.7%
8.3
Male
25.2%
24.7
13.2
14.1
13.8
8.9
100.0%
39.1
83.0%
17.0
100.0%
10.0%
9.5
Female
16.9%
25.9
17.8
18.7
13.1
7.5
100.0%
40.4
86.7%
13.2
100.0%
7.1%
7.0
Job Losers Unemployed 
27 Weeks or Longer
Total
23.5%
22.8
17.5
17.6
15.9
2.7
100.0%
38.4
79.0%
21.0
100.0%
10.4%
8.0
Male
26.0%
25.3
18.6
14.8
14.4
0.9
100.0%
36.6
74.6%
25.4
100.0%
11.1%
8.2
Female
19.3%
18.5
15.7
22.3
18.6
5.6
100.0%
41.5
86.6%
13.4
100.0%
9.2%
7.7
C/3Cd
90 
n> 
o
Some High School
High School Graduate
Some College
College Graduate
Total
Mean Years of School
Completed
Family Type and Position of
Recipient
Husband-Wife Headed
Family
Husband
Wife
Other Family Head
Unrelated Individual
(Not Living with
Family)
Nonhead Family
Member
Total
Weighted Sample Size
23.8
38.5
15.4
5.5
100.0%
11.2
30.0%
31.1
6.2
14.6
18.2
100.0%
6,817
23.2
32.9
17.6
6.9
100.0%
11.1
57.1%
n.a.
2.9
16.0
24.0
100.0%
3,579
24.4
44.5
13.0
4.0
100.0%
11.2
n.a.
65.4%
9.8
13.1
11.7
100.0%
3,238
26.2
40.7
10.0
4.7
100.0%
10.7
28.4%
20.3
6.8
12.4
32.2
100.0%
4,200
28.5
35.4
11.0
5.8
100.0%
10.7
44.8%
n.a.
3.2
12.4
39.7
100.0%
2,600
22.4
49.9
8.3
2.6
100.0%
10.8
n.a.
55.3%
13.0
12.5
19.2
100.0%
1,600
w
SOURCE: FSB data are weighted observations from the initial FSB/SUA survey. (See Corson et al., 1977). Data on job losers were obtained 3 
from special tabulations from the public use file of the Current Population Survey, March 1975. ™ 
NOTES: Distribution may not sum to total becuase of rounding: n.a. = not applicable.
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Pre-UI Employment Characteristics
The industries in which FSB and EB recipients and all long 
term unemployed job losers had been employed are reported 
in table III.2. The high rate of UI coverage among employees 
of most manufacturing firms is reflected in the relatively 
large proportion of FSB and EB recipients who had worked 
in these industries. However, fewer FSB than EB males were 
employed in durable goods manufacturing 27 percent com 
pared with 38 percent and fewer FSB than EB females 
worked in nondurable goods manufacturing 27 percent 
compared with 35 percent. Altogether, 44 percent of FSB 
recipients worked in manufacturing industries. The lower 
proportion of FSB compared with EB recipients (53 percent) 
from manufacturing industries may have been the result of 
manufacturing firms recalling employees when the economy 
started to recover. Relatively more EB recipients were recall 
ed to their pre-UI jobs and did not collect unemployment in 
surance long enough to begin collecting FSB.
FSB recipients held their pre-UI jobs for an average of 
about five years, and worked an average of about 26 months 
during the three years before claiming UI (see table III.3). 
EB recipients, especially the men possibly because they 
were younger, on average had not held their pre-UI jobs so 
long.
Mean weekly earnings of FSB recipients were generally 
slightly lower than the national average for production and 
nonsupervisory workers within the same industry, as were 
their hours of work. However, the relatively high proportion 
of FSB recipients from manufacturing resulted in their 
overall average earnings being higher than the national 
average for production and nonsupervisory workers. Only 
slightly fewer FSB than EB males belonged to a union 42 
percent compared with 45 percent.
TABLE III.2
Percentage Distribution of FSB and EB Recipients and of Job Losers 
Unemployed 27 Weeks or Longer, by Industry and Sex"
FSB Recipients
Industry
Agriculture, Forestry, 
Fisheries
Mining
Construction
Durable Goods 
Manufacturing
Nondurable Goods 
Manufacturing
Transportation and 
Public Utilities
Wholesale 
Trade
Total
0.7%
0.3
10.6
24.0
20.1
4.7
2.6
Male
1.1%
0.5
18.7
27.4
14.2
5.7
2.4
Female
0.3%
0.1
1.6
20.2
26.7
3.7
2.8
EB Recipients
Total
0.3%
0.5
11.3
30.7
22.2
4.2
1.4
Male
0.0%
0.7
19.6
37.8
12.3
5.4
1.5
Female
0.0%
0.3
0.5
21.5
35.3
2.5
1.3
Job Losers Unemployed 
27 Weeks or Longer
Total
1.2%
0.3
12.5
20.0
14.9
4.7
3.3
Male
1.5%
0.5
18.6
19.6
11.9
6.3
3.6
Female
0.8%
0.0
1.7
20.5
20.2
1.9
2.8
Retail Trade 
Services
15.5 11.0 20.5 12.6 8.5 17.8 19.5 16.7 24.5
17.1 12.5 22.2 13.1 8.6 18.8 22.0 18.8 27.7
00
o"§.'
n>°
3
Local Government 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4
Administration i ^1.6 2.5 0.0 2
State and Federal Gov 
ernment Administration 4.1 6.3 1.5 3.4 4.7 1.6 n~
________Total_________100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%_______ g- 
Weighted Sample Size______6.819 3.577 3.242 1.021 573 448 4,200 2,600 1.600_______
SOURCE: FSB and EB data are weighted observations from the initial FSB/SUA survey. Data for job losers were obtained from special tabula 
tions from the public use file of the Current Population Survey, March 1975.
NOTE: Distribution may not sum to total because of founding.
a. Industry refers to the job held prior to spell of unemployment. For FSB and EB recipients, this job, the "pre-UI" job, was the longest job 
during the twelve months prior to claiming unemployment insurance.
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TABLE III.3 
Pre-UI Employment Characteristics of FSB and EB Recipients
Pre-UI FSB Recipients EB Recipients
Employment Characteristic Total Male Female Total Male Female
Mean Number of Years 
Since First Regular Job
Mean Percentage of Years 
Worked Since Then
Mean Number of Months 
Worked in 3 Years 
Prior to Claim for Un 
employment Compen 
sation
Mean Number of Months 
Between Start and End 
Date of Pre-UI Job
Mean Gross Weekly Earn 
ings in Pre-UI Job8
Mean Hours Worked per 
Week in Pre-UI Job
Percentage Belonging to a 
Labor Union in Pre-UI 
Job
20.0 20.8 19.2 16.5 16.8 16.4
83.5 89.1 77.1 88.2 90.3 85.4
25.8 26.8 24.8 27.0 27.8 26.2
60.9 63.7 57.9 52.4 50.0 56.2
$170 $199 $139 $167 $208 $116
40.4 42.3 38.2 40.6 42.7 37.9
35.4 42.3 27.7 36.8 45.0 26.6
Weighted Sample Size 6,099 3,234 2,864 1,009 563 445
SOURCE: Data are weighted observations from the initial FSB/SUA survey, 
a. Adjusting pre-UI weekly earnings to 1975 dollars yielded the following results:
FSB Recipients EB Recipients
Total 
$180
Male Female
$210 $147
Total 
$173
Male Female
$215 $120
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C. Labor Market Experiences of FSB Recipients 
Following Their Initial Layoff
Labor Market Experiences Over Time
Data from the FSB surveys enable us to examine the labor 
market experiences of FSB recipients during approximately 
three years, beginning with the start of their UI claim (usual 
ly late 1974 or early 1975) and ending with the November 
1977 interviews. During this time (see table III.4) unemploy 
ment was the predominant status for all groups of recipients 
except young males (under age 25), who spent more time 
employed than unemployed, and older females (age 65 and 
over), who spent the majority of their time out of the labor 
force. Overall, FSB recipients spent nearly half the time 
unemployed. 6 The implied unemployment rate was 59 per 
cent over the entire three-year period. That is, FSB recipients 
who were in the labor force during that period were 
unemployed 59 percent of the time. With the exception of 
young males, all age-sex groups had unemployment rates 
over 50 percent. The highest rates were experienced by older 
respondents, both male and female. Other data from the 
survey show that respondents collected UI benefits, in 
cluding FSB, for an average of 53 weeks over this period. 
Because unemployment averaged about 78 weeks during the 
period, we can conclude that about 68 percent of all the 
unemployment experienced by FSB recipients was covered 
by unemployment benefits.
More than three-quarters of the weeks of unemployment 
experienced by FSB recipients over the three-year period 
discussed above occurred during the first completed spell 
that started at the initial UI claim date and ended before
6. An individual was characterized as unemployed if s/he was out of work and looking for 
a job, or awaiting recall a situation that generally did not apply to FSB recipients.
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TABLE III.4
Percentage Distribution, by Labor Force Status, of Time from 
Initial UI Claim Date to November 1977 for FSB Recipients, 
by Age and Sex
(Total Weeks)
Labor Force Status
Sex and Age
TOTAL
MALE
Total
Under 25
25-34
35-44
45-54
55-64
65 and over
FEMALE
Total
Under 25
25-34
35-44
45-54
55-64
65 and over
Sample 
Size
1,350
690
176
161
104
92
98
59
660
108
168
127
135
79
41
Employed
34.4%
38.7
48.3
46.9
42.2
36.1
24.9
8.0
29.7
36.8
30.9
37.0
31.2
17.1
3.3
Unemployed
49.4%
50.0
46.3
49.2
53.6
53.9
48.8
52.7
48.8
42.7
49.9
52.2
50.4
48.8
44.0
Out Of 
Labor Force
16.3%
11.4
5.4
4.0
4.2
10.0
26.3
39.4
21.5
20.6
19.2
10.8
18.4
34.1
52.7
Total
100.0%
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
SOURCE: Data are from the follow-up survey of FSB recipients.
NOTE: Initial UI claim filed usually in late 1974 or early 1975. Distribution may not add to 
total because of rounding.
November 1977. 7 Table III. 5 summarizes a few 
characteristics of those spells. Overall, the mean length of 
unemployment spells was about 61 weeks and that average 
was fairly uniform across most age-sex categories. Only
7. Only individuals who completed their initial unemployment spell prior to the second in 
terview were considered in this analysis. Three percent of the sample was unemployed con 
tinuously from the UI claim date until the interview, and they were not included in the 
analysis.
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TABLE III.5
Characteristics of the First Completed Unemployment Spell of FSB 
Recipients Starting at the Initial UI Claim Date©, by Age and Sex
Characteristic of Spell
Sex and Age
All FSB
Recipients
MALE
Total
Under 25
25-34
35-44
45-54
55-64
65 and over
FEMALE
Total
Under 25
25-34
35^4
45-54
55-64
65 and over
Sample 
Size
1,362
692
191
163
95
90
90
63
670
115
164
121
136
89
43
Mean Length 
of Completed 
Spell (Weeks)
61.3
58.0
48.0
52.2
65.6
65.3
70.5
61.2
64.8
58.6
67.3
70.0
67.1
59.7
59.6
Reason for End of Spell 
(Percentage of Recipients)
Employment
73.4%
80.8
92.7
90.8
92.6
86.7
58.9
23.8
65.8
76.5
68.3
83.5
70.6
41.6
11.6
Labor Force 
Withdrawal
26.6%
19.2
7.3
9.2
7.4
13.3
41.1
76.2
34.2
23.5
31.7
16.5
29.4
58.4
88.4
SOURCE: Data are from the follow-up survey of FSB recipients, 
a. Usually in late 1974 or early 1975.
younger males had a mean duration of less than one year, 
and no group had a mean duration of over 71 weeks. 
Although it is not reflected in the table, the distribution of 
the length of unemployment spells was highly skewed. Over 
17.5 percent of the sample had spells that lasted more than 
100 weeks. The standard deviation for the entire sample was 
45 weeks. Given the sample sizes, this variability makes most 
of the differences in cell means reported in table III.5 
statistically insignificant. Only for young males is there
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significant evidence of shorter completed unemployment 
spells.
The initial unemployment spells of FSB recipients could 
have ended in one of two ways: reemployment or labor 
market withdrawal. The lower portion of table III.5 shows 
the proportions of respondents by those reasons, and by age 
and sex. Nearly three-quarters of all initial unemployment 
ended in reemployment. For males there was a clear correla 
tion between increasing withdrawal from the labor force and 
increasing age. More than three-quarters of male FSB re 
cipients age 65 and over ended their unemployment spell by 
leaving the labor force. Females exhibited a generally similar 
pattern, but there was significantly more labor force 
withdrawal in the 25- to 34-year-old age category compared 
with adjacent age categories. Child-care responsibilities may 
explain this pattern.
Labor Market Activities in November 1977
By the time the November 1977 interview was given  ap 
proximately three years after the initial layoff 57 percent of 
the recipients were employed (see table III.6), and that figure 
represented a substantial increase over the 31 percent 
employment rate recorded at the first interview (March 
1976). Nevertheless, large numbers of FSB recipients remain 
ed unemployed. The implied unemployment rate8 for the 
sample was nearly 23 percent (compared with over 60 percent 
in March 1976). More than 26 percent of the sample was out 
of the labor force in November 1977, which represents a 5 
percentage point increase from the figure recorded on the in 
itial interview.
8. This is the percentage of the sample that was unemployed, divided by the percentage that 
was in the labor force (i.e., the percentage that was either employed or unemployed).
40 FSB Recipients
TABLE III.6
Percentage Distribution of FSB Recipients, by Labor Force 
Status in November 1977, by Age and Sex
Labor Force Status
Sex and Age
TOTAL
MALE
Total
Under 25
25-34
35-44
45-54
55-64
65 and over
FEMALE
Total
Under 25
25-34
35-44
45-54
55-64
65 and over
Sample 
Size
1,516
766
193
174
106
102
110
81
750
119
185
134
149
103
60
Employed
57.0%
62.9
79.8
79.3
74.5
56.9
39.1
12.3
51.1
58.8
58.9
64.9
55.7
27.2
10.0
Unemployed
16.7%
17.9
16.6
16.1
22.6
24.5
15.5
13.6
15.6
12.6
15.1
23.1
15.4
13.6
8.3
Out Of 
Labor Force
26.3%
19.2
3.6
4.6
2.8
18.6
45.5
74.1
33.4
28.6
25.9
11.9
28.9
59.2
81.7
Total
100.0%
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
SOURCE: Data are from the follow-up survey of FSB recipients. 
NOTE: Distribution may not add to total because of rounding.
Age and sex were important determinants of labor market 
status. Males were significantly more likely to be reemployed 
than females, and, particularly among males, younger in 
dividuals were more likely to be reemployed than older ones. 
These differences in employment rates were reflected in im 
plied unemployment rates that ranged from less than 17 per 
cent for young males to more than 50 percent for males in 
the 65-and-over category. Labor force participation rates 
also mirrored the employment pattern, ranging from a high 
of over 96 percent for young males to less than 19 percent for
FSB Recipients 41
older females. Over 62 percent of all FSB recipients age 55 
and over were out of the labor force in November 1977. Our 
analysis indicated that the vast majority of these individuals 
probably retired.
As reported above, 57 percent of the FSB sample was 
employed at the November 1977 interview date. It is in 
teresting to compare the jobs held at that date with the jobs 
respondents held prior to the start of their UI spell (what we 
call their "pre-UI" jobs). Such a comparison provides an in 
dication of the relative attractiveness of jobs held by the 
respondents and how successful they were in making a long 
term adjustment to their original job loss.
Analysis of this question indicated that there was a signifi 
cant decline in the percentage employed in manufacturing  
from nearly 50 percent on the pre-UI job to less than 40 per 
cent at the interview date. This result mirrored the general 
failure of manufacturing employment to return to its nation 
wide pre-recession level. However, the drop in our sample 
was far more severe than the national data indicate. The 
large decrease in manufacturing employment was matched 
by an almost identical increase in service employment, a 
result that reflected national trends.
About one quarter of the respondents were back in their 
pre-UI jobs at the date of the second interview. This result, 
however, depended significantly on the industry in which 
those jobs were. Individuals who worked at a pre-UI job in 
durables manufacturing were more than twice as likely to get 
that job back than were individuals in other industries. In 
dividuals working in durables manufacturing constituted 
nearly half (47 percent) of all respondents who did return to 
their previous employment. This result is consistent with 
other research findings that indicate layoffs subject to recall
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are more prevalent in durable goods manufacturing than in 
other industries. Our result shows not only the quantitative 
importance of this phenomenon, but, also, that at least dur 
ing the mid 1970s recession, the duration of layoffs in 
durables manufacturing was, for some workers, far longer 
than the typical "temporary" layoff.
Table III.7 compares weekly earnings and hours of 
employed FSB recipients on their new (current) jobs as of 
November 1977, with their pre-UI jobs. To allow for general 
increases in wage levels since the end of the pre-UI job, earn 
ings reported on that job were inflated by the percentage in 
crease in average weekly nonagricultural wages over the 
period. In terms of 1977 dollars, average weekly earnings 
were about 10 percent lower on respondents© current jobs 
than on their pre-UI jobs. Slightly more than half that 
decline is attributed to a reduction in average hours worked 
per week, and the remainder is accounted for by a $.17 
decline in average hourly earnings (from $5.01 to $4.84). 
Respondents over 55 years old experienced the largest reduc 
tion, both in hours and earnings. Younger individuals (under 
age 25) actually experienced increases in weekly earnings. 
For younger males there was also a slight increase in hours 
worked.
These data, therefore, give the impression that 
respondents© current jobs were somewhat less remunerative 
than their pre-UI jobs but that these differences were slight, 
at least for individuals in "prime" age working categories. 
However, this summary picture is misleading. Examination 
of data (not reported in the table) on the distribution of earn 
ings changes experienced by individuals show that fewer than 
half the respondents had current weekly earnings that were 
within 25 percent of their (inflated) pre-UI earnings. Nearly 
one-third of the sample had current jobs that paid less than
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TABLE III.7
Comparison of Hours and Earnings on Current Job (as of 
November 1977) to Pre-UI Job* for FSB Recipients, 
by Age and Sex
Job Measure
Weekly Earnings (dollars)
Sex and Age
TOTAL
MALE
Total
Under 25
25-34
35-44
45-54
55-64
65 and over
FEMALE
Total
Under 25
25-34
35-44
45-54
55-64
65 and over
Sample 
Size
836
461
150
129
75
55
41
11
375
66
106
88
82
28
5
Current 
Job
$184
230
197
251
278
243
218
75
128
143
130
136
111
126
30
Pre-UI 
Job
$167
206
158
223
232
249
221
202
121
109
121
129
111
115
114
Pre-UI Job 
(1977 dollars)
$202
250
191
270
282
302
270
251
146
130
147
156
136
141
145
Hours per Week
Current 
Job
38.0
40.9
41.4
42.2
41.9
40.9
37.5
25.0
34.7
35.9
35.6
35.9
32.7
33.7
9.0
Pre-UI 
Job
40.3
42.1
40.9
42.6
43.5
43.2
42.9
33.2
38.1
36.9
38.5
38.9
37.2
39.4
39.0
SOURCE: Data are from the initial and following FSB surveys, 
a. Pre-UI job ended usually in late 1974 or early 1975.
75 percent of the pay level of their pre-UI jobs. That reduc 
tion was experienced by a significant number of prime age 
workers and it was not only attributable to the reduced hours 
noted for the older workers in the sample. Hence, even 
among those FSB recipients who had found jobs by the inter 
view date, substantial numbers continued to face problems 
posed by their job loss and long unemployment spell. Of 
course, some workers managed to improve significantly on 
their pre-UI earnings. About 22 percent of all employed
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respondents had current earnings at least 25 percent above 
those of their pre-UI jobs. Men and women were equally 
likely to experience such large increases. There is some in 
dication that these increases were more prevalent among 
younger workers.
D. Conclusion
The brief description of FSB recipients presented in this 
chapter leads to two general conclusions regarding their 
characteristics. First, FSB recipients were more likely to be 
women and more likely to be older than other groups that 
were unemployed during the recession of the mid 1970s. This 
result stems partly from lower UI eligibility rates among 
younger workers and may also have been the result of 
weaker alternative economic opportunities for women and 
older workers. Second, FSB recipients had, in general, a long 
record of employment having worked an average of 17 
years, including 5 years at the job held prior to receiving UI 
benefits. Wages earned in these pre-UI jobs averaged slightly 
lower than the national average for production and non- 
supervisory workers within the same industries.
Following the layoff that led eventually to FSB, recipients 
were unemployed for a substantial length of time an 
average of 61 weeks during their initial completed spell. 
Three-quarters of these unemployment spells ended in 
reemployment and the remainder with withdrawal from the 
labor force. For males, increasing age was correlated with 
withdrawal from the labor force. By the time of the second 
interview, approximately three years after the initial layoff, 
57 percent of FSB recipients were employed, with males and 
younger individuals having had relatively greater success 
finding work. Unemployment rates for all groups were high, 
however. Compared with pre-UI jobs, the nature of jobs
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held by reemployed recipients at the second interview was ex 
tremely varied. Nearly one-third of all reemployed in 
dividuals experienced a reduction in real weekly wages of 25 
percent or more, and the average weekly wage fell by about 
10 percent. Declines in weekly wages were about equally af 
fected by decreases in hours worked and by decreases in 
hourly wage rates.

IV. ALLOCATIONAL EFFECTS OF FSB
A. Introduction
This chapter evaluates the FSB program from the perspec 
tive of economic efficiency. That is, it examines ways in 
which FSB affected the overall allocation of economic 
resources. Five additional sections follow. Section B 
develops a general rationale, based on microeconomic con 
siderations, for extension of UI benefits during recessions. 
Issues basic to evaluating any extended benefits program are 
discussed. Section C examines these issues in the FSB con 
text. Section D shifts to macroeconomic concerns and 
describes how extended UI benefits may help achieve 
stabilization goals. The actual performance of FSB in that 
regard is examined in section E. Finally, section F provides 
an overall assessment of FSB©s allocational impact.
B. Microeconomic Issues in UI Benefit Extensions
One way to analyze the allocational impact of UI benefit 
extensions is to consider them as "insurance" which pro 
vides workers some degree of earnings protection in the 
event of layoff. As with any insurance policy, its protection 
is valuable because it reduces financial risks. In the absence 
of a government program, it is probable that workers would 
seek such protection for themselves. 1 Most insurance poses
1. An example of this would be a worker who chooses job stability over high wages.
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the problem of "moral hazard" that is, being insured in 
creases the probability of incurring the risk (here, unemploy 
ment). Because unemployment insurance reduces the cost of 
being unemployed, it encourages individuals to be more 
selective about the jobs they are willing to accept or to reduce 
the intensity of their job search, and thereby prolongs their 
unemployment. What labor economists term "work 
disincentives" and what insurance economists term "moral 
hazard" amount to the same thing in the case of unemploy 
ment insurance.
Present UI provisions specifically partial wage replace 
ment, limited benefit duration, the waiting week, and 
availability-for-work and job search requirements reflect 
society©s preference concerning the trade-off between the 
program©s beneficial earnings replacement effects and its 
negative work disincentives effects. Each of these factors 
prevents the existing UI system from providing complete in 
surance against wage loss to unemployed workers and can be 
viewed as an attempt to control "moral hazard." An 
insurance-based rationale for extending the potential dura 
tion of UI benefits during recessionary periods can be 
developed by examining how the trade-off between risk aver 
sion and moral hazard changes during such periods.
Recessions obviously increase the risk of unemployment. 
This is partly due to an increased probability of being laid 
off and partly because of increased unemployment duration 
once a worker has been displaced. The second factor pro 
vides the impetus for benefit extensions. In their absence, 
recessions would increase the likelihood that UI recipients 
would remain unemployed sufficiently long to exhaust their 
benefit entitlements. In order to provide a degree of in 
surance protection similar to that of normal UI (i.e., enough 
to cover most periods of joblessness), it would be necessary
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to increase potential benefits durations. If the work disincen 
tives resulting from such extensions were small, policy 
makers might choose to provide nearly complete insurance 
compensation. But if such disincentives were substantial, a 
policy of less than complete compensation might be 
preferable. 2
A similar conclusion can be reached by means of job 
search theory, under which payment of UI may be viewed as 
efficient because it permits workers to hold out for better job 
matches. UI thereby improves the overall allocation of labor 
resources. Under this rationale, regular duration provisions 
reflect society©s view of the point at which further efficiency 
gains from subsidized job search cease. Because the 
prevalence of job offers declines during recessions, it may be 
desirable to extend the period of subsidized search because 
this would presumably permit recipients to obtain better jobs 
than those they otherwise would be forced to accept. This 
job search perspective provides a less clear-cut prescription 
than does the insurance perspective about exactly how long 
extensions should be, but it does focus attention on post- 
employment wages a topic that is typically neglected under 
the backward-looking insurance perspective.
Together, the insurance and job search efficiency 
arguments for extending UI benefits during recessions sug 
gest three major empirical issues:
(1) To what extent do extended benefits programs com 
pensate for lengthening unemployment durations brought on 
by recessions?
(2) Do such programs prompt individuals to stay 
unemployed longer?
2. This "optimal insurance" approach to UI benefit extensions is discussed in more detail 
in Nicholson and Corson (1980).
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(3) To the extent job search is prolonged by receipt of ex 
tended benefits, does that longer search result in re 
cipients* finding better jobs than those they would otherwise 
be forced to accept?
This paper examines each of these questions in the context 
of the FSB program. Because the issue of how well FSB com 
pensated for lengthening unemployment spells has implica 
tions for assessing the distributional as well as the alloca- 
tional consequences of the program, we will postpone a 
discussion of it until chapter V. In the next section we ex 
amine the other two issues.
C. Labor Market Effects of FSB
This section examines the effects of FSB on the labor 
market behavior of individuals. It is divided into two parts 
that reflect the empirical issues raised in the previous section: 
a discussion of the possible work disincentive effects of FSB, 
and an analysis of the effect of FSB on subsequent wage 
rates.
Effects of FSB on the Length of 
Unemployment Spells
There is by now a rather substantial research literature on 
the effects of unemployment insurance benefits on lengths of 
unemployment spells. Most of that literature focuses on the 
UI "wage replacement ratio" (that is, the ratio of UI 
benefits to net potential wages) and attempts to estimate the 
extent to which high values for that ratio lead to longer 
unemployment. Hamermesh (1977) concludes his summary 
of a number of studies with his "best" estimate that every 10 
percentage point increase in the wage replacement ratio is 
associated with about one half week of additional unemploy 
ment. He also indicates a belief that the disincentive effects
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of UI are somewhat smaller than this during periods of labor 
market weakness, but the empirical support he offers for 
that proposition is weak.
How relevant the findings of overall work disincentives 
associated with UI wage replacement ratios are to the FSB 
program is unclear. If UI incorporates disincentives, ex 
tending the duration of potential benefits must in some way 
increase these. But because extended benefits programs (in 
cluding FSB) have no effect on the weekly wage replacement 
ratio, there is no direct way to estimate the size of such ef 
fects from most of the empirical work. 3 A few studies have 
attempted to estimate directly the effects of different UI 
potential durations on the length of unemployment spells. 
Results for seven of these studies are summarized in table 
IV. 1. For ease of comparison, all results are reported as the 
estimated impact of one additional week of potential dura 
tion on the length of an individual©s unemployment spell, 
although not all of the studies cited actually stated their con 
clusions in that way. Overall, the impression given by table 
I V.I is that results are extremely varied. Estimates range 
from insignificant effects (Ehrenberg-Oaxaca) to point 
estimates that imply that each week of potential duration 
leads to almost one week of unemployment (Holen and 
Walsh).
One way to narrow this range is to eliminate from con 
sideration those studies that are based on problematic data.
3. If potential wages UI recipients can expect to receive decline with the duration of their 
unemployment, then individuals collecting FSB may have higher wage replacement ratios 
than otherwise similar individuals whose unemployment spells are just beginning. But this 
issue should more appropriately be considered in relation to the question of how wage 
replacement ratios are measured rather than to some direct FSB effect. Although various 
measures could be developed depending on how unemployed workers© "potential" wage is 
defined, we will continue common practice and identify the previous wage as the potential 
wage.
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TABLE IV.l
Summary of Research on Disincentive Effects of 
Longer UI Potential Durations
Author" Data Set
Effect of One Addition 
al Week of Potential 
Duration on Length of 
Unemployment Spell Comments
Ehrenberg- National Longitudi- 
Oaxaca (1976) nal Survey (various 
age/sex groups)
Holen (1977) UI recipients 
in five cities
Brewster FSB recipients in 
et al. (1978) fifteen states
Walsh (1978) Recipients of Redun 
dancy Payments in 
Ireland
Newton-Rosen UI recipients in 
(1979) Georgia
Solon (1979) UI exhaustees in 
New York
0 Potential duration 
poorly measured- 
effect biased 
toward zero
0.8 Used compensated weeks 
as dependent variable- 
effect positively biased
0.4-0.6 Simple use of potential 
duration as independent 
variable. Complete spell 
measured. Potential 
duration from adminis 
trative records
0.4-1.0 Larger estimated effect 
for weeks employed
0.4-0.5 Used weeks compensated 
and maximum likelihood 
procedure to reduce bias
0.3" Unusual independent
variable used in place of 
potential duration  
makes interpretation 
different
Moffitt- 
Nicholson 
(1979)
FSB recipients in 
fifteen states
0. 1 Used kinked budget con 
straint and maximum 
likelihood procedure. 
Estimate based on weeks 
employed
a. For detailed references see Bibliography
b. Based on Solon©s estimate that EB availability for 13 weeks increased unemployed weeks 
by 4. Solon estimate for the effect of EB availability on employment by "repeaters" (that is 
individuals who file for benefits in two or more successive years) was similar to this estimate 
also.
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In particular, studies in which potential UI durations are 
poorly measured might be excluded because coefficients 
estimated for such variables will be biased toward zero (this 
is probably the case for the Ehrenberg-Oaxaca study). 
Similarly, studies that use weeks of UI received as a depen 
dent variable will incorporate biases into their estimates 
because such a variable does not measure the full unemploy 
ment spell and is related to the way that potential UI dura 
tions are specified in state law. Only those studies based on 
weeks of compensation that take these problems explicitly 
into account should be considered.
Under these conditions, the Brewster et al., Newton-Rosen 
and Moffitt-Nicholson studies provide the most reliable 
estimates. According to these, each week of potential UI 
benefits increases the unemployment spell length by between 
0.1 and 0.4 weeks. Some portion of the remaining disparities 
in these estimates arises from the fact that the smaller 
(Moffitt-Nicholson) estimate does not include the effect that 
additional weeks of benefits may have on inducing UI re 
cipients to stay in the labor force rather than ceasing their 
job search efforts (because their study was limited only to 
labor market participants) whereas the larger estimates do, 
at least partly, include such effects. For the FSB program as 
a whole, then, the conclusion would be that the increase in 
average potential duration of about 24 weeks increased the 
length of unemployment spells by between 2.4 and 9.6 weeks 
where the larger of these figures also includes induced par 
ticipation effects.
Independent estimates of the effect of extended benefits 
programs based on macroeconomic data are generally 
unavailable. It has not been possible to differentiate between 
the effects of such programs and of other economic factors 
on the lengths of unemployment spells. In one study of ag-
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gregate exhaustion rates, Nicholson and Corson (1978) 
found that availability of EB and FSB benefits did increase 
such rates. That finding provides implicit support for the no 
tion that those programs also increased the length of 
unemployment spells. The quantitative size of such effects 
was roughly consistent with the smaller of the estimates from 
the microeconomic studies.
The overall conclusion then is that the FSB program did 
increase the average length of unemployment spell experienc 
ed by UI recipients by at least two and one-half weeks and 
perhaps significantly more if participation effects are taken 
into account. When applied to the 10.4 million individuals 
who collected a first UI payment in 1975, the 2.5 weeks 
figure implies there were about 26 million more weeks of 
unemployment that year than there would have been in the 
absence of FSB. In other words, about 6 percent of the total 
number of weeks of unemployment experienced by the 
civilian labor force in 1975 was attributable to FSB. Without 
FSB the overall unemployment rate that year would have 
been 7.9 percent instead of the 8.5 percent officially record 
ed. Allowing for participation effects would significantly in 
crease this estimated discrepancy between the actual and 
potential unemployment rates.
FSB and Job Search
Work disincentive effects arising from receipt of UI 
benefits may be counterbalanced by beneficial job search 
outcomes. Continued availability of benefits permits in 
dividuals to hold out for, and perhaps ultimately to receive, 
higher wages. Hence, from an overall allocational perspec 
tive, the effect of UI is ambiguous its negative work 
disincentive must be weighed against its positive promotion 
of better job matches. Which effect dominates remains an
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unanswered, empirical question. Some authors (Ehrenberg 
and Oaxaca, 1976 and Holen, 1977) have reported both 
significant disincentive effects and significant positive subse 
quent wage effects. Classen (1977), however, found only 
significant disincentive effects with no observable wage ef 
fects. These widely differing results may be explained by the 
absence of any universally agreed-upon conceptual model of 
the job search process and by the different statistical 
methodologies employed by the authors. An indirect test of 
the beneficial job search impact of UI benefits is provided by 
the literature on reservation wages and search intensity. 
Despite a strong theoretical presumption that UI benefit 
levels should affect reservation wages, there is practically no 
empirical support for the proposition (see Crosslin, 1975). 
Similarly, the effect of UI on search intensity has been found 
to be positive in some studies (Crosslin, 1975) and negative in 
others (Barren and Mellow, 1979). All of these studies are 
subject to methodological criticisms, and in any case, the 
precise connection between search strategies and ultimate 
wages has not been clearly documented.
Given the paucity of research on job search effects of 
regular UI and the contradictory findings of the few existing 
studies, it is not surprising that there is virtually no literature 
on the job search effects of FSB-type extended benefits pro 
grams. In theory, the direction of such effects seems clear 
enough. Extended benefits programs raise the extent to 
which UI compensates individuals for their unemployment 
spells (although the programs do not change the wage 
replacement ratio occurring during periods of benefit collec 
tion) and that should induce individuals to adopt higher 
reservation wages. This in turn should cause recipients to ex 
tend the duration of their unemployment spells and to hold 
out for ultimately higher wage rates. The first effect has 
already been described in the previous section where it was
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shown that increases in potential UI durations do seem to 
lead to increases in observed unemployment durations. 
Whether this increased unemployment is used productively 
to search for better jobs is the issue here.
Empirical evidence on the effect of extended UI durations 
on job search productivity is extremely meager. Among 
those studies of regular UI recipients that attempt to estimate 
the wage effect of changes in potential duration, only the 
Holen (1977) paper reports a significant impact. Her 
estimate suggests that each week of additional potential 
duration results in a $2.50 increase in post-unemployment 
quarterly earnings presumably attributed to the prolonged 
and more effective job search made possible by the added 
duration. But, as Holen herself points out, this estimate may 
be biased upward by the relationship between individuals© 
prior weeks of employment and their regular UI duration 
eligibility since prior weeks of employment are also cor 
related with future earnings.
Only the Corson et al. (1977) and Brewster et al. (1978) 
studies of FSB recipients explicitly considered the effects of 
longer potential duration on job search among extended 
benefits recipients. Those studies found little in the way of 
significant effects. Regardless of whether job search ac 
tivities were measured in terms of results (i.e., post- 
unemployment wage) or in terms of inputs to the search pro 
cess (i.e., reservation wages or various measures of search in 
tensity), no consistent effects of longer potential duration 
were found. But because these studies were limited to the 
relatively long term unemployed, the results do not really 
answer the question of how variations in UI potential dura 
tions might affect a more representative group of recipients.
In conclusion, very little is known about how changes in 
potential durations affect recipients© job search. On the
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theoretical level there is some presumption that increases in 
potential duration should lead to better job matches for ap 
proximately the same reasons that changes in UI benefit 
levels might. But empirical support for that proposition is 
virtually nonexistent. The issue remains open.
D. Macroeconomic Issues in UI Benefit Extensions
In addition to affecting individual UI recipients© decisions, 
extensions in potential duration also have effects on the 
overall economic activity level. The general theory behind 
these "macroeconomic" effects is described in this section, 
followed in the next section by some empirical evidence 
about the actual performance of FSB in that regard.
One purpose of UI benefits is to cushion the decline in 
disposable income that occurs during a recession and thereby 
to stabilize the overall level of aggregate demand and 
macroeconomic activity. For regular UI benefits, this result 
is more or less "automatic." No discretionary policy deci 
sion is necessary because the regular program simply absorbs 
a larger caseload and pays out higher aggregate levels of 
benefits as layoffs increase during the early, stages of a 
downturn. In this respect, the automatic stabilization pro 
vided by regular UI benefits is similar to that provided by the 
automatic reduction in federal tax receipts during recessions, 
although of a much smaller dollar magnitude. 4 For the ex 
tended benefits (EB) program, the argument is similar but 
more complicated. Since 1970, EB benefits have been "trig 
gered" automatically as national or state insured unemploy 
ment rates increase. Frequently, these trigger requirements
4. For example, VonFurstenberg (1976) found that differences between actual and "full 
employment" UI benefits (regular plus EB) were less than 22 percent of the decline (below 
full employment levels) in federal tax revenues during each of the recession years since 
1958. Similar results are suggested by the data in table IV.2, described below.
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have been modified in response to recessionary indicators 
(for example, rising exhaustion rates). Hence, although they 
are not so "automatic" as regular UI benefits or federal tax 
collections, EB benefits can, for most purposes, be so 
categorized along with the regular programs. Those benefits 
represented about 23 percent of total regular UI benefits dur 
ing the recession of the mid 1970s.
Contrary to the automatic character of the regular UI and 
EB programs, FSB-type programs are usually regarded as 
"discretionary," that is, the programs have been im 
plemented through explicit legislative action in response to a 
perceived policy need. From a stabilization perspective, 
therefore, it is appropriate to compare FSB to other discre 
tionary fiscal policies. In making that comparison on a 
theoretical level, two criteria are of central concern: the size 
of the "multipliers" and the relative flexibility with which 
FSB can be implemented in response to stabilization needs. 5 
With respect to the first issue, there is general agreement that 
the multiplier for government transfer payments (such as 
FSB) is fairly large. It is clearly larger than the multiplier for 
tax reductions (because transfer recipients spend a higher 
fraction of their incomes than do taxpayers in general) and it 
may be nearly as large as the multiplier for government ex 
penditures on goods and services. Whether there are reasons 
to expect the multiplier for extended UI benefits to differ at 
all from the one for other government transfer programs is 
unclear. On the one hand, UI recipients may have higher in 
comes than do other transfer recipients, thereby implying a 
somewhat smaller multiplier. On the other hand, because UI 
benefits are more closely related to temporary declines in 
family income than are other transfer payments, there is
5. A third issue, the macroeconomic effect of financing FSB or other discretionary fiscal 
policy, will not be discussed here because, to a first approximation, FSB would be a little 
different from other policies.
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probably a high marginal propensity to spend out of such in 
come to maintain existing living standards, and hence the 
multiplier would be correspondingly high. There is no clear 
way to differentiate between these theoretical probabilities, 
and empirical research on the matter is virtually nonexistent.
With respect to legislative and administrative flexibility, 
FSB-type emergency benefit extensions have a number of ad 
vantages. Because the programs operate through an existing 
administrative mechanism, payments can be initiated quickly 
without developing a new payments process. Of course, 
recessionary tax rate reductions share the same advantage, 
but withholding procedures and filing dates do constrain 
their flexibility to some degree. UI extensions can also be 
more quickly implemented than either federal spending or 
federal employment programs because much less planning 
and attention to the nature of individual projects is required. 
Finally, though more conjecturally, UI extensions provide a 
more flexible policy response to recessions because the 
political intricacies involved in implementing them may be 
less complex than for most other spending policies.
Of course, extending UI benefits is not a perfectly flexible 
fiscal policy. There may be lags in implementation arising 
from the need to coordinate federal policies with existing 
state UI systems, and peak-load problems in local offices 
may inhibit the timely disbursement of payments. Phasing 
out extended benefits programs also involves some inflex 
ibility primarily because of the built-in inertia which pro 
vides recipients with a relatively large number of additional 
weeks of eligibility (two 13-week segments in the case of 
FSB, for example). On the whole, however, these inflex 
ibilities are probably of minor importance compared with 
other discretionary fiscal policies.
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From a theoretical perspective, FSB-type emergency ex 
tensions compare rather favorably to other macrostabiliza- 
tion policies. They have both the flexibility and the potential 
multiplier impact on aggregate demand to warrant con 
sideration as an important policy option. Of course, such a 
conclusion is based on a priori considerations and does not 
address the actual performance of FSB a subject to which 
we now turn.
E. Macroeconomic Performance of FSB
In this section we will examine two aspects of the actual 
macroeconomic performance of FSB: (1) the importance of 
FSB relative to other federal stabilization measures during 
the recession of the mid 1970s and, (2) administrative and 
technical problems involved in implementing and phasing 
out FSB. Information on the first of these questions is 
presented in table IV.2 which shows total FSB benefits paid 
during the 1974-77 period. For comparison purposes, table 
IV.2 also presents data for the same period on total UI 
benefits, on the federal budget deficit, and on two other 
discretionary fiscal policies: outlays for public service 
employment and discretionary tax rate reductions. 6 Three 
general conclusions may be drawn from these data. First, 
during the 1974-75 recession, FSB benefits constituted a 
relatively small portion of all discretionary fiscal policies. 
Payments under the program accounted for less than 10 per 
cent of the "full employment" deficit and, of course, made 
up an even smaller fraction of the actual federal deficit. Tax 
reduction (both automatic and legislated) clearly played a far 
more important role in both automatic and discretionary 
federal stabilization efforts.
6. The table provides data on both the actual federal budget deficit and the "full employ 
ment" deficit. The latter concept adjusts the actual deficit for the effect of the business cy 
cle itself on the expenditures and tax collections and is therefore a better measure of discre 
tionary fiscal policy.
TABLE IV.2
Comparison of UI, FSB and Other Federal Stabilization Policies, 1974-77 (Quarterly Data are Annualized in SBillions)
Federal Deficit
Calendar 
Quarter
1974.1
.2
.3
.4
1975.1
.2
.3
.4
1976.1
.2
.3
.4
1977.1
.2
.3
.4
Full Employment 
Actual Estimate8
5.5
7.6
8.0
21.7
48.0
99.9
66.3
68.2
57.5
47.3
52.2
57.4
37.2
40.9
53.6
53.6
1.3
3.5
4.5
2.5
6.9
55.2
29.9
32.3
28.6
21.0
27.0
30.9
26.5
27.7
40.2
42.2
A11UI 
Payments©*
5.4
6.3
7.3
9.4
15.1
18.6
18.7
17.6
17.7
15.3
14.7
14.7
15.1
12.3
11.6
11.8
FSB Public Service Tax 
Payments Employment Expenditures Cutsc
..
 
~
~
0.8
1.8
2.5
3.5
3.8
3.3
2.1
2.0
2.1
1.5
0.9
0.5
0.5
0.2
0.3
0.4
1.1
2.7
2.0
2.5
2.7
2.8
2.4
2.8
2.4
2.9
3.7
4.9
 
 
 
~
1.8
42.3
15.2
15.0
12.9
12.8
11.6
11.8
1.4
3.4
7.9
6.7 m
SOURCE: Survey of Current Business. Annual Surveys of Fiscal Policy. nT 
a. Based on estimated budget outlays and revenues assuming unemployment rate of 5 percent "full employment" level. £ 
b. Includes UI, EB, FSB and SUA (Special Unemployment Assistance, a temporary program that paid benefits during the period to workers not ^ 
yet covered by UI).
c. For 1975-76 includes the Tax Reduction Act of 1975, the Revenue Adjustment Act of 1975, and the Tax Reform Act for 1976. For 1977 in- <y\ 
eludes only the Tax Reduction and Simplification Act of 1977. Reductions estimated assuming full employment. *"
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Second, the data in table IV.2 show that even though FSB 
benefits were small relative to the overall federal budget, 
they were relatively large when compared with all UI benefits 
or with spending under public service employment pro 
grams. During the period 1975.3-1976.2 (when FSB benefits 
for a full 26-week period were in effect in practically all 
states), payments under FSB amounted to about 20 percent 
of all UI benefits and to perhaps as much as 30 percent of 
"recession induced" (those being paid because of the above 
normal levels of unemployment) UI benefits. Hence, FSB 
contributed in a major way to the stabilizing ability of the UI 
system as a whole. Similarly, for most of the quarters during 
the recession, FSB benefits totaled more than expenditures 
under public service employment programs, so they 
shouldn©t be regarded as trivial to overall stabilization ef 
forts.
A third conclusion is that the actual timing of FSB benefit 
payments during the 1975-76 period was not precisely consis 
tent with the needs of stabilization policy. Aggregate 
payments did not peak until 1976.1, a period well after the 
trough of the recession had been passed. Similarly, FSB 
benefit levels in the first two quarters of 1975 were relatively 
small although these were probably the quarters during 
which the benefits were most needed for maintaining ag 
gregate purchasing power. The reason for this lag in the 
growth of FSB benefits relates to the particular way in which 
FSB was implemented and to the nature of its relationship 
with the regular UI program. We now examine these issues.
A first obvious reason for the lag in the start of large-scale 
spending under FSB is simply that it took time for in 
dividuals suffering layoffs in the early stages of the recession 
(say, November or December 1974) to be unemployed long 
enough to qualify for FSB. Regular UI plus EB provided in 
dividuals with 1.5 times their regular UI entitlement, which
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for many recipients (though not, of course, for all workers) 
amounted to 39 weeks of benefits. Hence, the majority of 
workers laid off in late 1974 might have started to collect 
FSB sometime in the third quarter of 1975. The sharp up 
swing in FSB benefits in 1975.3 and 1975.4 reflects exactly 
this lagged response to the recessionary layoffs. 7 Benefit 
payments during early 1975, on the other hand, went 
primarily to individuals who had been laid off prior to the 
recession but had not ended their UI benefit years when FSB 
went into effect. These individuals constituted a "backlog" 
that became eligible for benefits immediately upon im 
plementation of the FSB program. 8 The presence of this lag 
between recessionary layoffs and the actual buildup of FSB 
payments makes it necessary to modify somewhat the 
theoretical notion that emergency UI extensions represent 
highly flexible and responsive tools for macroeconomic 
stabilization purposes. Rather, the lag between policy im 
plementation and the ultimate timing of its impact should be 
clearly recognized.
Although purely administrative implementation problems 
also caused some part of the lag in the buildup of FSB 
benefit payments, the effect was probably negligible. By the 
end of the first quarter of 1975 all states had reached agree 
ment with the Department of Labor to begin paying benefits, 
and operational problems in making those payments were 
relatively small despite the peak load problems being ex 
perienced by local UI offices. Probably more significant
7. The increase in caseloads also reflected implementation of the second tier of FSB in 
March 1975.
8. Because of the way in which UI benefit years are defined, some individuals in the FSB 
backlog had lost their jobs well before 1974. The Mathematica sample of FSB recipients 
contains a small number of individuals who started a benefit year as early as 1971, for ex 
ample. This occurred because some individuals had exhausted their EB entitlement but had 
not found subsequent reemployment in states that had not gone off EB since 1971 (primari 
ly Washington). For these individuals, FSB represented a pure windfall.
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from a macroeconomic perspective were the legislative and 
operational difficulties involved in finally terminating the 
FSB program. As table IV.2 shows, FSB benefits continued 
at an annual rate of over $2.0 billion into the first quarter of 
1977, more than a year and one-half after the low point of 
economic activity. This occurred because FSB was gradually 
phased out state-by-state via trigger mechanisms and 
because, even when new claims were no longer being ac 
cepted under FSB, individuals already collecting benefits 
were entitled to their full extensions. Of course, it might be 
argued that fiscal stimulation was still needed for the 
economy well into 1977, but whether FSB was an ap 
propriate policy for that purpose remains an open issue. On 
the one hand, FSB benefits, because they were concentrated 
in areas of high unemployment, probably did continue to ex 
ert a beneficial effect on local economies. On the other hand, 
from a macroeconomic perspective, it may be the case that 
stimulative policies in the upswing of the business cycle are 
better focused on investment than on consumption activities 
and therefore other policies might have dominated FSB in 
long term effectiveness.
F. Conclusion
In this chapter we have developed conceptual bases for 
judging the allocational effects of emergency extended UI 
benefits programs and have reviewed some FSB program im 
pacts on these effects. For some issues, the FSB-provided 
evidence seems relatively clear. For example, although there 
is some uncertainty about the precise size of the effect, there 
seems to be sufficient empirical support for the proposition 
that longer potential UI durations do provide an incentive 
for individuals to remain unemployed longer. On a 
macroeconomic level, FSB benefits were shown to have 
potentially stabilizing effects, although the program did ex-
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hibit some shortcomings in terms of the precise timing of its 
fiscal impact. Relative to discretionary tax reductions and 
various automatic stabilizers, however, the effect of FSB was 
quite small.
Although the analysis of FSB so far does clarify some 
allocational questions, several others remain relatively un 
touched. There is, for example, no very good evidence about 
the effect of FSB benefits on recipients© job search behavior. 
Nor has there been an empirical investigation of how the 
macroeconomic effects of FSB might differ from the effects 
of other federal transfer programs. Answers to these and 
several other questions are needed if we are to have a com 
plete assessment of the allocational effects of emergency UI 
extensions.

V. DISTRIBUTIONAL EFFECTS OF FSB
A. Introduction
In this chapter we examine two distributional arguments 
for extension of FSB during recessions. The first, which we 
term the "intertemporal equity argument," concerns the 
question of whether workers laid off during recessions are 
treated by UI in a way similar to workers laid off during nor 
mal periods, and the extent to which extensions are necessary 
to assure similarity of treatment. A second argument for ex 
tensions what we call the "income maintenance 
argument" concerns the necessity of providing extended 
benefits to low income workers during recessions. Our ex 
amination of these arguments begins in section B with a brief 
analysis of the intertemporal equity issue and is followed in 
section C with a more extended treatment of the question for 
FSB specifically. Section D considers the theoretical income 
maintenance arguments for benefit extensions, followed by 
an analysis (in section E) of the FSB experience. Section F 
provides a brief summary of our analysis of distributional 
issues.
B. Intertemporal Equity and Benefit Extensions
One goal of the UI system is to provide insurance protec 
tion for individuals suffering a loss of earnings through in 
voluntary unemployment. Because of financial constraints 
and potential disincentive effects, only a portion of lost
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weekly earnings is replaced by UI and the duration of 
benefits is limited. Consequently, it is necessary to develop a 
measure of "adequacy" in order to judge how well the UI 
system meets its protection goals. Most discussions of this 
concept have focused on the weekly benefit amount and 
compared it to both past earnings and to a recipient©s 
"nondeferrable" or "recurrent" expenses. The assumption 
behind this latter concept is that if UI benefits cover recur 
rent expenses (food, mortgage payments, and so forth), in 
dividuals will not be forced to make major spending pattern 
adjustments while unemployed. Any loss in their standards 
of living will be limited and temporary; their standards will 
return to pre-layoff levels once they are reemployed. Clearly, 
the potential duration of benefits is an important factor in 
determining the adequacy of UI protection. If benefits 
covered only a small part of an individual©s layoff period, 
they would be judged inadequate regardless of how high 
weekly payments were. Furthermore, potential durations 
that might be judged adequate during nonrecessionary 
periods might be inadequate during the lengthy unemploy 
ment spells of a recession. This latter point suggests a ra 
tionale for the extension of benefits during recessionary 
periods: if we wish to treat individuals equally in terms of 
benefit adequacy, those laid off during recessions should be 
eligible for longer potential durations of UI than individuals 
laid off during nonrecessionary periods. This argument is 
similar to the insurance rationale for extensions presented in 
the previous chapter, where it was shown that extensions 
may be required to maintain the "optimal" level of in 
surance protection when labor market conditions worsen. 
Both arguments suggest focusing on how well extended 
benefits programs compensate for the effects of lengthening 
unemployment during recessions. We now examine that 
question for FSB.
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C. FSB Coverage of Lengthening Unemployment Spells 
During the 1974-75 Recession
In this section we examine the extent to which extended 
benefits provided under FSB compensated for the longer 
unemployment spells experienced by individuals. The discus 
sion is divided into three parts. The first part examines some 
general measures of labor market experiences during the 
1974-75 recession and describes the difficulties involved in 
using those measures to appraise FSB. Next, we examine UI 
exhaustion rates and the effect of FSB upon them. Finally, 
we show that exhaustion rates alone may not provide a com 
plete picture of UI adequacy during recessions and propose a 
more general measure of the overall earnings replacement 
that UI provides.
Unemployment Spells During the Recession
It is clear that the average length of unemployment spells 
increased substantially during the recession of the mid 1970s. 
Table V. 1 reports some general measures of unemployment 
during that period, including a summary of the unemploy 
ment spell figures customarily published from the Current 
Population Survey (CPS). 1 These data show that as the na 
tional total unemployment rate rose from 5 percent in the 
first quarter of 1974 to nearly 9 percent in 1975.2, the 
reported median length of unemployment spells rose from 
4.7 weeks to nearly 9 weeks. Even more significant from the 
perspective of UI extended benefits programs, the propor 
tion of all unemployment spells accounted for by spells that 
were currently over 26 weeks in duration rose dramatically 
from only 7 percent of the total in 1974.1 to more than 20
1. This survey is conducted monthly by the Census Bureau and is the principal source of 
U.S. labor market data.
TABLE V.I
Unemployment Measures During the Mid 1970s
Calendar 
Quarter
1974.1
2
3
4
1975.1
2
3
4
1976.1
2
3
4
1977.1
2
3
4
Total 
Unemployment 
Rate
5.0
5.1
5.6
6.7
8.2
8.9
8.5
8.3
7.7
7.6
7.7
7.7
7.5
7.2
6.9
6.6
Current Unemployment Spells8
Average Duration Median Duration Percentage 
(Weeks) (Weeks) Over 26 Weeks
9.5
9.7
9.9
9.9
11.3
13.9
15.5
16.2
16.5
15.9
15.5
15.2
14.8
14.6
13.9
13.6
4.7
4.8
5.0
5.1
6.9
8.8
9.0
9.1
8.7
7.9
7.8
8.0
7.4
6.9
7.1
6.9
7.0
7.5
7.6
7.4
9.3
13.6
18.4
19.8
21.0
18.5
16.7
17.0
16.5
15.2
13.8
13.4
Insured 
Unemploymeni 
Rateb
3.2
3.3
3.3
4.4
5.8
6.5
6.1
5.3
4.2
4.4
4.8
4.7
4.0
3.8
4.0
3.9
SOURCES: Columns 1-4 Employment and Earnings, various issues. Column 5 Unemployment Insurance Statistics, various issues.
NOTE: All data are national figures, seasonally adjusted.
a. Spell duration represents continuous weeks of unemployment up to time of monthly survey.
b. Insured unemployment rates reflect regular UI claimants only. EB and FSB claimants are excluded.
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percent of the larger totals in late 1975 and early 1976. This 
expansion in the incidence of long unemployment spells also 
had the effect of increasing the reported average spell length 
substantially.
Using these published figures on the length of unemploy 
ment spells to assess the desirability of the benefit extensions 
incorporated into the FSB program poses a number of dif 
ficulties. First, the data include many unemployed in 
dividuals who were not eligible for UI (new entrants and UI 
exhaustees, for example). Exactly how the length of com 
pleted unemployment spells of UI recipients changed during 
the recession is not known. Second, CPS data on unemploy 
ment spells are known to exhibit a number of conceptual 
problems that make it difficult to infer from them what is ac 
tually happening to individuals© unemployment spells. 2 And, 
third, UI and the CPS use different tests to differentiate be 
tween individuals who are temporarily unemployed and 
those who are out of the labor force. It is possible that many 
of the individuals identified as being long term unemployed 
in the CPS would not meet UI "availability for work" re 
quirements. Also, the CPS data include UI exhaustees who 
cannot collect additional UI during their present unemploy 
ment spell. Hence, the CPS data may overstate the 
unemployment duration of UI recipients. These combined 
shortcomings of the CPS data make it impossible to ascer 
tain the extent to which the incidence of relatively long 
unemployment spells increased among individuals eligible 
for UI during the recession of the mid 1970s.
2. See, for example, Kaitz (1970) who points out that there are two opposite biases in the 
CPS figures. The fact that the CPS does not measure completed spells but rather spells in 
progress biases estimated spell lengths downward. The fact that the CPS oversamples those 
with long spells biases estimated spell lengths upward. During periods when average spell 
lengths are increasing, this second effect is likely to become the more important bias.
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About all that can be concluded from the CPS data on 
lengthy unemployment spells is that the prevalence of such 
spells obviously increased and that the intertemporal equity 
criterion suggests that UI benefits should have been extended 
to cover some portion of them. Whether extensions under 
EB alone would have been sufficient for that purpose is dif 
ficult to say. Data on mean and median spell lengths from 
the CPS suggest that EB was insufficient because these in 
dicators increased by much more than the 50 percent expan 
sion in UI entitlement that EB provides. But such calcula 
tions are, at best, only indicative of the need for an FSB-type 
emergency program and provide little guidance as to the 
shape such a program should take. To obtain more specific 
insights into the question requires the use of other indicators.
Effect ofFSB on Exhaustion Rates
One indicator of the need for FSB-type extensions is pro 
vided by studies of UI exhaustion rates and how they were 
affected by FSB availability. Because FSB provided as many 
as 26 additional weeks of benefits, it presumably had a 
significant impact on the probability that any individual 
completely exhausted his or her full UI entitlement. Assess 
ing the precise size of that effect is made difficult, however, 
by the absence of detailed longitudinal data for a random 
sample of UI recipients from which exhaustion rates might 
be measured directly. Rather, exhaustion rates under FSB 
must be inferred from existing program data, from various 
special samples of UI recipients, and from aggregate 
statistical studies. Here we review these sources of informa 
tion and conclude that they show a reasonably consistent pic 
ture that FSB reduced total exhaustion rates for UI during 
the recession of the mid 1970s to levels well below those that 
characterized regular UI during nonrecessionary periods.
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Table V.2 presents quarterly aggregate program data on 
the number of first and final payments made to recipients 
under state UI programs and under FSB for the period 
1973.1 to 1977.4. The table also shows the ratio of the 
number of UI final payments to the number of UI first 
payments, lagged two quarters, which, although it poses a 
number of difficult interpretational problems, is a figure fre 
quently referred to as "the" exhaustion rate for regular UI. 3 
Because quarterly exhaustion rates defined in this way have 
major seasonal components, five-quarter moving averages 
of the rates are reported in the table. These data show that 
immediately prior to the recession, about 30 percent of UI 
recipients were exhausting their regular UI benefits, a figure 
somewhat above the 25 percent norm usually believed to 
characterize the UI program during periods of relatively full 
employment. During the recession (roughly the period 
1974.4-1975.4, a period long enough to include the lagged ef 
fects of the sharp downturn in late 1974), exhaustion rates 
for regular UI were about 10-12 percentage points above the 
pre-recession levels. That is, during the recession, approx 
imately 40-42 percent of UI recipients exhausted their regular 
benefit entitlement.
Did FSB, in combination with the permanent standby EB 
program, succeed in substantially mitigating this recession- 
induced rise in regular UI exhaustion rates? Although the 
absence of detailed longitudinal data on regular UI recipients 
during the period precludes an exact answer, EB and FSB 
program data (reported in table V.3) provide a rough
3. As an approximation to the theoretical concept of the probability that an individual UI 
recipient will exhaust his or her benefits, this calculated exhaustion ratio is subject to biases 
arising from aggregation, seasonality, the changing composition of the pool of UI re 
cipients (especially in states with variable duration provisions), and the complex effects that 
accompany changes in UI duration provisions. Aggregate data must be used, however, 
because theoretically correct exhaustion probabilities from program operating data are not 
available on a regular basis.
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TABLE V.2 
Quarterly Program Data for Regular UI and FSB, 1973-77
Regular UI Program"
Calendar 
Quarter
1973.1
2
3
4
1974.1
2
3
4
1975.1
2
3
4
1976.1
2
3
4
1977.1
2
3
4
First 
Payments 
(Thousands)
1791
1074
12S6
1207
2455
1304
1622
2348
4064
2466
2100
1935
2908
1705
1937
2036
3040
1530
1732
1682
Final 
Payments 
(Thousands)
422
397
342
333
421
504
509
492
737
1210
1255
976
953
864
767
701
811
776
667
592
Moving Average 
Exhaustion 
Rate6
0.28
0.30
0.30
0.32
0.29
0.33
0.36
0.40
0.38
0.41
0.43
0.43
0.37
0.39
0.40
0.38
0.35
0.36
0.36
0.35
FSB Program"
First 
Payments 
(Thousands)
-
-
--
 
-
-
--
435
597
755
874
753
667
410
388
428
344
297
107
Final 
Payments 
(Thousand)
--
-
--
 
--
-
-
40
266
430
476
514
434
285
267
267
282
158
202
SOURCE: Regular Unemployment Insurance First and Final Payments from Unemployment Insurance 
Statistics (various issues). Exhaustion rates calculated by the author. FSB data from special tabulations 
provided by the Unemployment Insurance Service of the U.S. Department of Labor©s Employment and 
Training Administration.
a. Excludes recipients who drew benefits under federal unemployment compensation programs for 
federal civil service employees (UCFE) and ex-military servicemen (UCX).
b. Five quarter moving averages of quarterly exhaustion rates calculated as final payments in each 
quarter divided by first payments in quarter ending six months earlier.
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estimate of the effects. These data indicate that EB exhaus 
tion rates during the 1974-1977 period averaged about 66 
percent. Hence availability of EB alone reduced the exhaus 
tion rate from about 40 percent for regular UI to about 26-28 
percent (= .66 x .40-.42), or to somewhat below the pre- 
recession level. Availability of FSB reduced the rate still fur 
ther. The FSB data in table V.3 indicate an exhaustion rate 
for that program of about 60 percent. Hence it appears that 
with the FSB paid during the recession of the mid 1970©s, 
only about 16-17 percent (= .26-.28 x .6) of those individuals 
who received a first payment under the regular state UI pro 
gram during the period remained unemployed sufficiently 
long so as to exhaust all benefits. FSB reduced the final ex 
haustion rate to well below its full employment level.
TABLE V.3 
Annual Program Data for EB and FSB, 1974-1977
EB Program FSB Program
Year
First Final
Payments Payments Final + First
(Thousands) (Thousands) Payments
First Final
Payments Payments Final + First
(Thousands) (Thousands) Payments
1974
1975
1976
1977
Total,
1974-77
915
4012
3253
2656
10836
468
2477
2405
1761
7111
-
2661
2218
1176
0.66 6055
-
1212
1500
909
3621
-
-
-
-
0.60
SOURCE: Data for EB from Handbook of Unemployment Insurance Financial Data, U.S. Department of 
Labor, Employment and Training Administration, Unemployment Insurance Service. Data for FSB from 
special tabulations provided by the Unemployment Insurance Service.
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Another way of estimating the impact of FSB on the final 
exhaustion rate for UI uses statistical regression techniques. 
In a case study of Pennsylvania and Georgia, Hight (1975) 
found that the final exhaustion rate for UI could be kept 
relatively constant by a policy of increasing potential dura 
tions by about 4-5 weeks for each 1 percentage point increase 
in the insured unemployment rate (IUR) above 4 percent. 4 
Since, as previously shown, the IUR reached a maximum of 
about 6.5 percent (on a seasonally adjusted basis) during the 
recession, an increase of 12-13 weeks of potential benefits 
(approximately what was provided by EB) would have kept 
the final exhaustion rate relatively constant, according to the 
Pennsylvania and Georgia analyses. The larger increases 
resulting from implementation of FSB would presumably 
have reduced that rate.
Similar results using aggregate data from all 50 states were 
estimated by Nicholson and Corson (1978). They found that 
the positive effect on exhaustions of a 1 percentage point in 
crease in the IUR could be offset by a 15 percent increase in 
average potential durations. (This calculation disregards any 
disincentive effects that may arise from increases in potential 
durations. Such effects were discussed in the previous 
chapter.) Hence, the impact of the rise in the IUR from 3.5 
percent prior to the recession to 6.5 percent at its height 
could have been offset by roughly a 50 percent expansion in 
potential durations, which is about the expansion that was 
provided under the regular EB program. The Nicholson- 
Corson results suggest that the additional duration provided 
by FSB (over and above that from EB) should have reduced 
final exhaustion rates to about half the level they would have 
been in the program©s absence a finding generally consis 
tent with similar estimates provided from the program data.
4. The IUR reflects regular UI claims only.
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FSB Compensation for Earnings Losses
The argument presented above implicitly assumes that the 
exhaustion rate is an appropriate measure of whether UI is 
providing protection during recessionary periods similar to 
the protection provided during normal periods. An alter 
native and more comprehensive measure of protection is 
provided by the "earnings replacement rate"  that is, the 
ratio of all UI benefits received during the period of 
unemployment to the after-tax earnings losses suffered dur 
ing that period. We examine this measure of protection with 
the purpose of identifying how durations must be adjusted to 
keep average earnings replacement rates roughly comparable 
between recessionary and nonrecessionary periods. The 
average earnings replacement rate can be expressed as a 
weighted average of the mean earnings replacement rates of 
exhaustees and nonexhaustees. 5
r = (1-p) WRR + p-WRR 
where:
r = expected replacement rate
p = probability of benefits exhaustion
D = potential benefits duration for typical claimant
S = Unemployment duration for exhaustees
WRR = UI weekly benefit amount divided by after-tax 
earnings on the pre-UI job.
To understand how this equation works it may be helpful 
to consider a few examples. First, consider a claimant who
5. This formulation ignores the waiting week but that omission does not affect our results 
substantially. The appendix to this chapter presents results that take account of the waiting 
week.
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does not expect to exhaust his or her benefits. Then p = 0, 
and r and WRR are identical (say approximately 0.6 for 
typical claimants). For an individual with the same WRR 
who has a 50 percent probability of exhausting his or her 
benefits, the computation also requires knowledge of the ex 
pected total weeks of unemployment. Suppose S = 39 for 
exhaustees and that D = 26. Then r can be calculated to be 
0.5 [ = .5 x .6 + .5 x .6 x (26/39)]. In our analysis of the 
equation, we assume that its various components take on 
their average values in the population. We are therefore 
analyzing the situation of a typical claimant.
We expect that both the probability of exhaustion and 
unemployment duration are functions of the unemployment 
rate and UI potential duration. An examination of the ex 
pression shows, as we would expect, that if the exhaustion 
rate increases, the expected replacement rate drops. Further 
more, if we increase potential duration sufficiently so as to 
hold the exhaustion rate constant during a recession, the 
replacement rate may still drop if the ratio of potential UI 
duration to actual unemployment duration of exhaustees 
declines. This may well be the typical case in a recession 
when duration of unemployment tends to be much longer 
than normal. Thus, holding exhaustion rates constant (as 
described previously) may not hold the earnings replacement 
rate constant.
To examine this relationship in more detail we can 
calculate what change in potential duration will maintain a 
constant earnings replacement rate for an individual when 
unemployment rates rise. In the Appendix to this chapter we 
show that a 1 percentage point rise in the insured unemploy 
ment rate can be offset by a 5.1 week rise in the potential 
duration of UI benefits. Furthermore, we show that if poten 
tial durations are increased only enough to keep the exhaus-
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tion rate constant, the earnings replacement rate will drop 
slightly (less than one-half a percentage point). By this 
criterion, potential duration should have been increased dur 
ing the recession of the mid 1970s by about 15-18 weeks 
because the IUR rose about 3.0 to 3.5 points during that 
period. That is, EB benefits alone were not quite enough to 
keep average earnings replacement rates constant, but the 
addition of up to 26 weeks of FSB (in addition to 13 weeks of 
EB) was too much. One additional 13-week extension (or 
less) through FSB would have been more than sufficient to 
provide individuals laid off during the recession with earn 
ings replacement rates similar to those of individuals laid off 
prior to the recession.
Hence, whether FSB was "necessary" in order for the UI 
system to continue to provide protection to unemployed 
workers against earnings losses resulting from the recession 
similar to what is available during nonrecessionary periods 
remains a difficult question. Clearly, the incidence of long 
term unemployment increased substantially during the reces 
sion and some type of extended benefits program was re 
quired if the commitment to provide workers with similar 
protection for their complete unemployment spells was to be 
fulfilled. General labor market data suggest that extensions 
provided under the regular EB program would have been in 
sufficient to meet this need. But such aggregate measures of 
duration are subject to a number of biases which may 
overstate the needs of the Ul-eligible population for longer 
UI protection. Data on FSB exhaustions suggest that EB 
alone might have been sufficient to prevent exhaustion rates 
from rising during the recession. Of course, even if exhaus 
tion rates were held constant, the absolute number of ex- 
haustees would have increased because of the increase in the 
total number of UI recipients during the period. EB alone 
might not have prevented some decline in earnings replace-
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ment rates, which our estimates show would have fallen 
slightly. But that fall could have been offset by extensions of 
a much smaller magnitude than FSB actually provided.
D. Income Maintenance and Benefit Extensions
A second distributional rationale for FSB relates to the 
concern that individuals who exhaust regular UI plus EB 
during a recession will lose their principal source of income 
and fall below poverty level. By this argument, the only 
feasible way to maintain above poverty level incomes for 
these exhaustees is to extend UI benefits. This argument then 
focuses attention on the lower end of the income distribution 
and suggests that the adequacy of extended benefits be 
judged relative to a social standard such as the poverty line 
rather than relative to an individual©s pre-UI earnings or 
recurrent expenses. The discussion then reflects the blurring 
of the distinction between UI and welfare (first presented in 
chapter II) that occurs as longer potential durations are ex 
amined.
This antipoverty rationale for UI extensions during reces 
sions is based on two implicit assumptions. First, it is as 
sumed that present income maintenance programs will not 
provide exhaustees with an income large enough to prevent a 
substantial increase in the number and proportion of ex- 
haustee households with incomes below the poverty line. 
Second, it is assumed that the incidence of low incomes 
among exhaustees will be more severe during a recession. If 
this were not the case, this argument for UI extensions could 
be applied to nonrecessionary periods as well. 6 The possibili-
6. In fact, even if the incidence of poverty is higher during recessions, we might argue that if 
we help poor exhaustees during recessions, we should do the same when there is no reces 
sion. Doing this, however, would alter the UI program©s insurance orientation on a perma 
nent rather than temporary basis.
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ty that the poverty problem among exhaustees is more 
serious during recessions is based on three additional con 
siderations. First, during recessions other household income 
(e.g., spouse©s earnings) is likely to be lower, which will con 
tribute to a greater incidence of poverty after UI benefits are 
exhausted. Second, if potential UI durations were extended 
during recessions to yield exhaustion rates that equalled 
those of nonrecessionary periods, exhaustees might still be 
expected to face longer post-exhaustion spells of unemploy 
ment than during nonrecessionary periods. In that case, in- 
tertemporal equity considerations would suggest extending 
durations to equalize the overall rate of earnings replacement 
provided by UI in recessionary and nonrecessionary times. 
And third, even if post-exhaustion durations of unemploy 
ment were unaffected by the recession, we might argue that 
individuals observed during nonrecessionary periods have a 
greater voluntary component to their unemployment. Other 
things equal, the existence of lower reservation wages or 
smaller UI disincentive effects during recessions would pro 
vide some evidence of this and would provide a rationale for 
further income support. In the next section we examine each 
of these considerations in the case of FSB.
E. Antipoverty Effects of FSB
In this section we use data from the FSB program to 
discuss three issues related to the antipoverty argument for 
emergency benefit extensions. First, we examine whether 
other income security programs would have provided ade 
quate protection to EB exhaustees. Next, we investigate 
whether exhaustees are more needy during recessions. Final 
ly, we ask how well FSB actually fulfilled antipoverty goals.
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Adequacy of Other Income Security Programs
Tables V.4 and V.5 show whether other income security 
programs would have provided adequate protection to EB 
exhaustees in the absence of FSB. Data in table V.4 show 
eligibility rates for each of four major means-tested pro 
grams that might have provided income to EB exhaustees in 
the absence of FSB. 7 The data make clear that most families 
would not have been eligible for any means-tested benefits 
except food stamps. Considering both the income and asset 
tests for eligibility, 57 percent of the families would have 
been eligible for food stamps and only 10 percent eligible for 
either the regular AFDC program (Aid to Families with 
Dependent Children) or the AFDC-U (unemployed parent) 
program. Very few families would have been eligible for 
Supplemental Security Income (SSI) or means-tested 
veterans© benefits. The low number of households eligible 
for AFDC, SSI, and veterans© benefits compared with food 
stamps derives mostly from the fact that few FSB families 
fell into the categories of families serviced by these pro 
grams, that is, single-parent families with children or two- 
parent families with an unemployed father or an in 
capacitated parent (AFDC), the aged (SSI), 8 or veterans with 
wartime experience (veterans© benefits). For example, only 5 
percent of the families met the categorical requirements for 
regular AFDC and only 10 percent met those for AFDC-U. 
The Food Stamp Program, on the other hand, has no 
categorical requirements. The impact of these categorical re-
7. A detailed discussion of the method used to compute eligibility and benefits is contained 
in Corson et al. (1977), appendix 8. An analagous method was used to compute eligibility 
and benefits for the welfare reform proposal in this chapter.
8. SSI is also available to the blind and disabled; however, it was assumed that FSB re 
cipients, given their past work experience, were unlikely to meet the SSI requirements for 
blindness or disability. This assumption was also used in the eligibility calculations for the 
welfare reform proposal that is described below.
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TABLE V.4
Percentages of FSB Households Eligible for Benefits Under 
Selected Transfer Programs if Unemployment Compensation 
Had Not Been Available 
(15 State Survey, 1975-77)
Percentage of FSB Recipients 
Transfer Programs_______________Eligible for Program
Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) 
Categorically Eligible
AFDC Regular 5.4% 
AFDC-U 10.1 
Income Eligible (AFDC and AFDC-U Combined) 12.3 
Income and Asset Eligible (AFDC and AFDC-U Combined) 9.7
Supplemental Security Income
Categorically Eligible 10.2 
Income Eligible 5.2 
Income and Asset Eligible 3.5
Food Stamps
Income Eligible 64.8 
Income and Asset Eligible 56.8
Means-Tested Veterans© Benefits
Categorically Eligible 2.0 
Income Eligible 1.4
Weighted Sample Size8 6,316
SOURCE: Corson et al. (1977), Table IV.5.
NOTE: "Categorically Eligible" means that recipients© families fit categories required for 
program eligibility (e.g., that they had minor children in the household). "Income 
Eligible" means that the family was both categorically eligible and had an income suffi 
ciently low to be eligible for program benefits. "Income and Asset Eligible" means that the 
family was both income eligible and met asset tests imposed by the program.
a. Sample sizes for computations vary because of incomplete survey data for certain items.
84 Distributional Effects
TABLE V.5
Percentage Distribution of FSB Households by Ratio of Income 
at FSB Start (Assuming Full Utilization of Transfer Benefits) 
to Poverty Income Level, for Selected Measures of Income" 
(15 State Survey, 1975-77)
Ratio of Household Income Income 
Income to Poverty Line"____Excludes FSB____Includes FSB
0.0-0.5 25.3Vo 0.6%
0.5-1.0 14.0 16.4
1.0-1.5 18.8 22.2
1.5-2.0 12.6 14.8
2.0-3.0 15.5 21.4
3.0-4.0 8.0 12.6
4.0 and Over 5.8 12.1
Total lOO.OVo 100.0%
Weighted Sample Sizec 6,094 5,816
SOURCE: Corson et al. (1977), Table IV.6.
a. All income measures assume full utilization of transfer benefits including the bonus 
value of food stamps. Income from this latter source is currently not counted in the official 
U.S. government definition of income.
b. If a ratio of income to the poverty line, calculated to several decimal points, equalled the 
boundary between two specific class intervals, that observation was assigned to the lower 
class interval.
c. Sample sizes vary due to incomplete survey data for certain items.
quirements is illustrated most strongly by considering female 
heads of households in which no male resided. In this case, 
data (not reported in the table) show that 74 percent of these 
families were categorically eligible and 70 percent of that 
total were income and asset eligible for AFDC, yet this latter 
group accounted for only 5 percent of the total FSB popula 
tion.
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Because AFDC and SSI eligibility imply food stamp 
eligibility, approximately 13 percent of those on FSB would 
have been eligible for two or more of the major welfare pro 
grams. Thus, very few would have been eligible for more 
than one program that provides cash or, in the case of food 
stamps, "near" cash benefits. The bulk of the recipients 
with low incomes would have been eligible for food stamps 
only.
Despite these low eligibility rates, it is possible that the 
programs© benefits might have been concentrated on those 
with the lowest household incomes, and, therefore, that we 
might still conclude that extensions of UI were not necessary 
to maintain incomes at some minimal level. To investigate 
this issue, we imputed benefits from transfer programs, 
assuming full utilization by eligible recipients of FSB, and 
examined the distribution of household income relative to 
the poverty line at the date of first receipt of FSB. The results 
are reported in table V.5 for two income distributions. The 
first excludes FSB from income received at the start of FSB 
and adds imputed transfers (including the bonus value of 
food stamps9), using the dollar value of transfer benefits that 
FSB recipients would have been eligible for in the absence of 
FSB. The second one includes FSB and uses imputed 
transfers that FSB recipients would have been eligible for 
while receiving FSB. The data clearly show that, for many 
households, the current means-tested transfer system would 
not have maintained household incomes at even a minimal 
level in the absence of FSB benefits. Thirty-nine percent of 
the households would have had incomes below the poverty 
line in the absence of FSB (counting imputed transfers),
9. These data are not comparable to standard government tabulations which do not count 
any in-kind benefits as income. Food stamps were included here because they are potential 
ly an important income source for the population being examined.
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while only 17 percent would have had incomes below poverty 
while on FSB if all welfare benefits were fully utilized. 10
The facts that few of the FSB recipients were categorically 
eligible for cash benefit programs and that UI benefits were 
usually more generous than AFDC or SSI and food stamps 
were the main reasons why the current means-tested transfer 
programs would not have filled the gap in income that would 
have been left in the absence of an FSB program. Before 
concluding, however, that this situation will continue to be 
true in future recessions, we examine the implications of 
potential changes in the existing welfare system.
Among the most important proposed reforms of the cur 
rent system is the removal of categorical restrictions on 
eligibility for benefits. Because these restrictions are one of 
the main reasons why current means-tested programs do not 
fill the income gap that would be left if UI were not 
available, we reexamined this question assuming the Carter 
Administration©s 1977 welfare reform proposal had been 
enacted (The Program for Better Jobs and Income). 11 This 
proposal would have replaced the AFDC, SSI, and Food 
Stamp programs with a federal cash benefit program for all 
types of families; state supplements for the aged, blind, 
disabled, and families with children; an expanded Earned In 
come Tax Credit; and public jobs for adult members of 
families with children. While such an ambitious, far- 
reaching program may never be enacted, a reanalysis 
substituting this program for the current means-tested
10. These comparisons ignore possible behavioral responses by FSB households to the loss 
of UI benefits. That is, some individuals might have accepted jobs if benefits had not been 
extended.
11. This analysis is reported in Corson (1978). The Carter proposal is similar to many other 
recent suggestions and is therefore indicative of the more general issue of how welfare 
reform might affect the need for emergency extensions.
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transfer system shows that 58 percent of the FSB households 
would have been eligible for one or more of the proposed 
benefits (cash, tax credit, or a job) in the absence of FSB. A 
comparison of the effectiveness of this policy proposal in 
preventing poverty among potential FSB recipients is provid 
ed in table V.6. That table shows that, although the in 
cidence of poverty in the absence of FSB is reduced only 
marginally (from 39 percent to 33 percent) under the welfare 
reform option, benefits under that program would be con 
centrated upon the correct households. For example, under 
this plan 13 percent of the households, compared with 25 
percent under the current system, would have had incomes 
below 50 percent of the poverty line. FSB would still have 
had an additional antipoverty effect; virtually no households 
would have had incomes below half the poverty line and only 
17 percent would have been below the poverty line. Whether 
this additional antipoverty effect would be desirable during a 
future recession is, of course, a political question. However, 
the data make clear that the antipoverty argument for UI ex 
tensions would be less persuasive if a major welfare reform 
proposal were enacted.
Income Needs for Exhaustees During Recessions
Another assumption underlying the antipoverty argument 
for FSB-type extensions is that we expect the effect of the 
loss of UI benefits to be more severe during recessions. 
Otherwise, the antipoverty argument would apply to 
nonrecessionary periods as well. As outlined in the previous 
section, three pieces of empirical evidence could support this 
hypothesis: available household income might be less during 
recessions in the absence of UI extensions, post-exhaustion 
unemployment durations might be longer, and both reserva 
tion wages and the disincentive effects of extensions might be 
smaller during recessions (thereby implying that the long 
term unemployed were "more deserving").
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TABLE V.6
Antipoverty Effectiveness of FSB, Current Welfare 
System and Welfare Reform Option"
Percentage of Households
Percentage of Households Below 0.5 Times 
___Option________Below Poverty Line___________Poverty Line____
No FSB, Current 
Welfare Program 39% 25%
No FSB, Welfare 
Reform Option 33% 13%
FSB plus Current 
Welfare Program 17% 1%
a. Calculations based on data from initial and follow-up FSB surveys.
Unfortunately, little relevant empirical evidence is 
available on any of these issues. Data on household incomes 
are available for FSB recipients (at the beginning of FSB) 
and for a sample of regular UI exhaustees (at the time of ex 
haustion) in four cities for October-November 1974. 12 
Because the regular UI exhaustee sample depleted its benefits 
just prior to the start of the recession, we could consider it 
representative of a nonrecession case. A comparison of 
household income available to this group with that available 
to the FSB sample in the absence of FSB supports our 
hypothesis. Thirty-five percent of the regular UI exhaustees 
had household incomes below the poverty line compared to
12. Details on the regular UI exhaustee study can be found in Nicholson and Corson (1976).
Distributional Effects 89
39 percent of the FSB households studied later. 13 The com 
parable proportions below 1.5 times poverty were 49 and 58 
percent, respectively. While these differences are statistically 
significant, they are not very large and only weakly support 
the argument that the "need" of exhaustees is greater during 
recessions.
Empirical evidence for our other two hypotheses is even 
sparser. Reemployment rates for exhaustees provide an in 
dication of post-exhaustion duration and such rates are 
available for three recent studies: the four-city study men 
tioned above, an Arizona study, and a Pennsylvania study 
(table V.7). Benefit exhaustion in the four-city sample occur 
red just prior to the start of the recession in 1974, so 
reemployment rates were probably negatively affected by 
this recession. 14 The provision of extended benefits two or 
three months after exhaustion also affected these rates in the 
same direction. The Arizona sample, on the other hand, ex 
hausted benefits at the end of the same recession (May 1976 
to August 1977) and should probably be viewed as a 
nonrecession sample. Finally, the Pennsylvania data were 
collected in 1966-67, a nonrecessionary period when 
unemployment rates were lower than in the 1970s.
Reemployment rates for each of these samples tend to sup 
port our hypothesis. Differences in reemployment rates 
among the three samples are statistically significant and
13. Data for the exhaustee sample are for white recipients only. This group was chosen as 
more representative of UI recipients in general than the entire exhaustee sample. Its concen 
tration in four cities led to a high proportion of black recipients in the sample. For both ex 
haustees and FSBs, we have included imputed transfer benefits in income because that 
measure of poverty status was more readily available. This makes little difference to the 
comparison.
14. Here we are using data from the four-city exhaustee study as representing the recession 
case while for the household income comparison we used it as the nonrecession case. The 
argument for this dual usage is that exhaustion occurred prior to the recession but the post- 
exhaustion period occurred primarily during the recession.
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substantially larger for the nonrecession samples (12 to 17 
percentage points higher at the end of 12 weeks). However, 
this evidence provides only weak support for our hypothesis. 
The samples are not nationally representative, they were not 
all drawn at ideal times, and the reemployment rates for the 
four-city exhaustee sample may have been influenced by the 
extension of UI as well as by the weak labor market.
TABLE V.7
Percentage of UI Exhaustees Reemployed After Exhaustion 
of Benefits (Data from Three Sample Surveys)
Weeks Since 
Exhaustion
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
Sample Size
Four-City 
Study (1974-75)
5.5%
10.5
14.1
16.9
20.3
23.0
25.2
1054
Arizona 
Study (1976-77)
11.5%
18.3
26.4
30.2
37.0
40.0
42.1
235
Pennsylvania 
Study (1966-67)
--
24.5
--
33.0
--
35.5
--
11,511
SOURCE: Data from the four-city study are for whites only and are found in Nicholson 
and Corson (1976), table V.8. Data for the Arizona study from Burgess and Kingston 
(1979), table II.7. Data for the Pennsylvania study are reported in Murray (1974).
One final element that would support the hypothesis that 
UI exhaustees are more needy during recessions than those 
exhausting benefits during nonrecessionary periods is that 
unemployment during a recession may have a smaller volun-
Distributional Effects 91
tary component. Other things equal, that hypothesis would 
be supported if we found lower reservation wages or smaller 
UI disincentive effects during recessions. We were unable to 
find any evidence on the cyclical nature of reservation wages, 
and only one study provides evidence for UI disincentive ef 
fects over the business cycle, but it does support our 
hypothesis. This study (Wandner, 1975) using data on state 
averages, showed that the disincentive effect of UI benefits 
as reflected in longer duration of unemployment was smaller 
in high than in low unemployment years.
Antipoverty Effectiveness of FSB
The empirical evidence presented above, though limited, 
suggests that the assumptions underlying the antipoverty 
argument for FSB are essentially correct, i.e., current in 
come maintenance programs do not provide "adequate" in 
comes for UI exhaustees and their need for income support is 
probably greater during recessionary periods. Consequently, 
we should evaluate how well the FSB program fulfilled this 
antipoverty goal. Two measures of this effect are available. 
First, at the time of EB exhaustion, 39 percent of the FSB 
households would have had weekly incomes below the pover 
ty line if FSB had not been extended (see table V.5). With 
FSB, this figure dropped to 17 percent. Furthermore, with 
FSB, less than 1 percent had incomes below one-half the 
poverty line compared with 25 percent without FSB. 15 An 
alternative way of examining this effect is to consider 
household income over one year rather than at a given point 
in time. Data on the distribution of 1975 household income 
are presented in table V.8 for individuals receiving an FSB 
first payment in that year. These data show that without FSB 
33 percent of the households would have had incomes below
15. These figures overstate somewhat the percentage of households with incomes above the 
poverty line because they assume full utilization of all other transfer benefits.
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TABLE V.8
Percentage Distribution of FSB Households by Ratio of 
1975 Income to Poverty Income Level, for Selected 
Measures of Income" 
(15 State Survey, 1975-77)
Ratio of Household
Income to Poverty Lineb
0.0-0.5
0.5-1.0
1.0-1.5
1.5-2.0
2.0-3.0
3.0-4.0
4.0 and Over
Total
Weighted Sample Sizec
Income
Excludes FSB
13.2%
19.3
15.0
13.2
19.7
9.9
9.6
100.0%
6,769
Income
Includes FSB
6.2%
16.7
17.4
14.5
21.5
12.5
11.3
100.0%
6,805
SOURCE: Special tabulations from the MPR FSB study data, 
a. These income figures exclude the bonus value of food stamps.
b. If a ratio of income to the poverty line, calculated to several decimal points, equalled the 
boundary between class intervals, that observation was assigned to the lower class intervals.
c. Sample sizes for computations vary because of incomplete survey data for certain items.
poverty level in 1975 if they had made no response to the loss 
of FSB benefits. 16 With FSB, 23 percent had annual incomes 
below poverty level. Thus, FSB reduced the incidence of 
poverty by nearly one-third. This effect varied widely by 
household type. For example, other data (not reported in the 
table) show that 36 percent of the households of married 
male FSB recipients and 18 percent of the households of 
married female recipients would have had incomes below the 
poverty standard without FSB. With FSB, the corresponding 
figures were 23 and 15 percent, respectively.
16. These data include actual but not imputed transfer payments. The bonus value of food 
stamps was not included in table V.8 tabulations but was included in those presented above. 
This makes little difference for the comparison.
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While the above figures show that the FSB program had a 
substantial antipoverty effect, the data reported in table V.8 
also show that some households would have maintained 
relatively high incomes without FSB. Almost 40 percent 
would have had 1975 incomes above two times the poverty 
level without FSB while 10 percent would have had incomes 
above four times that level. For a family of four, this 
represented an annual income in 1975 of about $22,000. 
Thus, although the FSB program was superior to the 
available means-tested programs in reducing poverty for UI 
eligibles, it was target inefficient because a substantial 
amount of benefits went to the nonpoor.
F. Conclusion
In this chapter we examined two income distributional ra 
tionales for the FSB program. The first argued that in order 
to treat individuals laid off during recessions in the same way 
as those laid off at other times, UI benefits should be extend 
ed because of the longer unemployment durations experi 
enced during recession.
Two measures of this intertemporal equity were examined. 
First, final exhaustion rates were estimated for the period 
1973-78. It was shown that EB alone was sufficient to keep 
these rates from rising above their pre-recession levels and 
that the FSB program had the effect of reducing exhaustion 
rates to about half their pre-recession levels. As a more com 
prehensive measure of intertemporal equity we introduced 
the "earnings replacement rate," i.e., total benefits divided 
by after-tax earnings lost throughout the workers© 
unemployment. We estimated that to hold earnings replace 
ment rates constant, potential UI duration should be extend 
ed by 5.1 weeks for each 1 percentage point increase in the 
insured unemployment rate. This estimate implies that, dur-
94 Distributional Effects
ing the recession of the mid 1970s, EB benefits alone were 
not quite enough to keep earnings replacement rates con 
stant, but the addition of 26 weeks of FSB was too much. 
One emergency 13-week extension (or less) would have been 
more than sufficient to provide individuals laid off during 
that relatively severe recession with earnings replacement 
rates equal to those of individuals laid off in nonrecessionary 
periods.
The second argument for the FSB program claims that it 
was needed to prevent the household income of UI ex- 
haustees from dropping below the poverty level. This income 
maintenance argument assumes that existing means-tested 
transfer programs would not have provided adequate income 
support for UI exhaustees and that the need for income sup 
port by UI exhaustees was greater during recessionary than 
during nonrecessionary periods. Available empirical 
evidence was examined and it suggested that both of these 
assumptions were correct, although the evidence concerning 
the second was quite weak. We then examined the antipover- 
ty effectiveness of the FSB program and concluded that FSB 
benefits had a substantial effect. These benefits reduced the 
incidence of poverty among FSB households by about one- 
third. However, this antipoverty effect was target inefficient 
because substantial benefits were distributed to the nonpoor.
APPENDIX TO CHAPTER V 
EARNINGS REPLACEMENT RATE CALCULATIONS
In the body of this chapter we indicated that the total earn 
ings loss replacement rate for an individual was:
r = (l-p) WRR + p   WRR (5_) (1)
\ S /
where:
r = replacement rate
p = probability of exhaustion of benefits
D = potential duration of benefits
S= unemployment duration contingent on exhaus 
tion of benefits
WRR= UI weekly benefit amount divided by after-tax 
earnings in the pre-UI job.
We also indicated that p and S were functions of the 
unemployment rate (u) and potential duration (D).
To investigate the relationship between changes in the 
replacement rate, the unemployment rate and potential dura 
tion we can derive the expression for the differential of r with 
respect to u and D.
=du+  dD 3u a
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If we then ask what change in potential duration (D) will 
keep the earnings replacement rate constant with an increase 
in the insured unemployment rate (u) of 1 percentage point, 
we set du=l, dr = 0, substitute in values for the other 
variables and compute dD. 1 Estimates for each of these 
variables are available from prior studies except for S, aS/au 
and aS/aD. 2 Estimates for these parameters can be com 
puted if we assume that the distribution of unemployment 
spells is an exponential with mean I/a. Then it can be shown 
that S = D+ -|-. For our calculation we have assumed that 
the mean duration of unemployment spells is four weeks and 
hence, S = 30 weeks. To compute aS/au we notice that 
aS/au = a(l/a)/au. An estimate for this value is 1.2. 3 Finally, 
aS/aD= 1 + a(l/a)/aD which we have set equal to 1 for the 
computation. a(l/a)/aD is the disincentive effect of increas 
ing D and if it were taken into account, D would need to be 
increased further to keep r constant. Instead, we have assum 
ed that we are not interested in replacing earnings lost 
because of the disincentive effect and we have set a(l/a)aD 
equal to zero.
Using the numbers in the previous paragraph, we find that 
dD equals 5.1 weeks, i.e., if the IUR rises by 1 percentage 
point, duration must rise by 5.1 weeks to keep earnings 
replacement rates constant for individuals. 4 While this 
number represents our best estimate of dD, the values used 
in the calculation for some of the parameters are subject to
1. Notice that when dr = 0, the expression in (2) is independent of WRR.
2. For the calculation we have assumed that p= .27 and D = 26. Values for ap/au (.0482) 
and ip/aD (-.0139) were computed from a study of exhaustion rates (Nicholson and Cor- 
son, 1978, table III.7).
3. In chapter II we reported that the derivative of duration with respect to the unemploy 
ment rate was .93. This can be converted to the derivative of duration with respect to the in 
sured unemployment rate by multiplying by 1.33 (See Nicholson and Corson, 1978, page 
106).
4. Note that the aggregate compensation rate would not be equalized because WRR 
changes as the mix of the unemployed changes.
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error. In particular, alternative estimates were available for 
ap/au and aS/au. 5 Table V.A.I reports values for dD for a 
range of estimates of ap/au and aS/au. These estimates 
range from 4.2 to 7.3 weeks. While this range is fairly large it 
does not substantially affect the conclusion reached in the 
chapter namely, that FSB overcompensated for the effects 
of the recession. Finally, the calculations presented above ig 
nore the effect of the UI waiting week on the earnings 
replacement rate. To include this, the first term in the expres 
sion for r should be multiplied by (D/(D + 1)). If this is done, 
two terms are added to the expression for the differential of r 
and the resulting estimate for dD is raised slightly to 5.4 
weeks.
TABLE V.A.I
Alternative Estimates of the Required Change 
in Weeks of Potential Duration3
1.2
as/au 1.6
2.1
.0275
4.2
5.2
6.5
dp/du
.0375
4.6
5.6
6.9
.0475
5.1
6.1
7.3
a. Entries show the increase in weeks of potential duration required to keep the earnings 
replacement rate constant in response to a one percentage point increase in the insured 
unemployment rate.
Another possibility is to compute what happens to the 
earnings replacement rate if the exhaustion rate is held cons 
tant when du = 1. This can be computed by noticing that
5. Alternative estimation techniques used in the exhaustion rate study provided estimates 
for ap/au that ranged from .0275 to .0475. The .0475 estimate was selected as the best 
because the effect of the state UI system on the measurement of the IUR was controlled for 
best in the regression that produced the .0475 estimate. For FSB recipients *S/au was 
estimated to be 2.1 for males. The 1.2 estimate was chosen as better because it was derived 
from a regression on all unemployed individuals, not just those experiencing long 
unemployment spells.
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dp = (dp/du)du + (dp/dD)dD and substituting this in equa 
tion (2). When du= 1 and dp = 0 (i.e., the exhaustion rate is 
constant), dD = 3.5 and we get
dr = - p (WRR) (D/S2) (dS/du)
+ 3.5fp (WRR/S) - p (WRR) (D/S2) (dS/3D) 1 . (3)
If we assume WRR= .65 and keep the same values for the 
other variables, we find that dr = -.003 when the exhaustion 
rate is held constant. That is, a policy that held exhaustion 
rates constant during recessions would have resulted in a fall 
in the earnings replacement rate of .003 (i.e., 0.3 percent) for 
each 1 percentage point increase in the IUR.
VI. UI EXTENSIONS IN FUTURE RECESSIONS
A. Introduction
In the previous chapters we examined experience with the 
FSB program in the recession of the mid 1970s and evaluated 
its allocational and distributional effects. We now consider 
how this experience might be applied during a future reces 
sion. The discussion is organized around several policy ques 
tions that concern the timing, duration, benefit levels, fi 
nancing, and other aspects of an FSB program. In conclu 
sion, we discuss some alternatives to FSB-type programs.
B. When Should an FSB-Type Program Be Enacted?
The answer to this question depends to a large extent on 
the primary rationale for extending benefits during a reces 
sion. If the primary aims of such an extension are to com 
pensate individuals for the increase in unemployment dura 
tions and to treat these individuals in the same way as in 
dividuals laid off during nonrecession periods (that is, keep 
the probability of exhausting all UI benefits about the same), 
the current EB program would be sufficient if the recession 
were relatively mild. For example, the automatic extensions 
mandated under the EB program would keep exhaustion 
rates from rising above their pre-recession levels if the rise in 
the insured unemployment rate remained below 3 per 
centage points. Alternatively, if policy makers wished to
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keep earnings replacement rates 1 constant instead of exhaus 
tion rates, EB would be sufficient if the rise in the insured 
unemployment rate were less than about 2.5 points. 2
If, instead, the primary rationale for an FSB program is to 
help prevent a rise in the incidence of poverty among the 
unemployed, an FSB program might be enacted that would 
provide lower exhaustion rates or higher earnings replace 
ment rates than would normally result. That is, an FSB pro 
gram might be enacted in relatively mild as well as relatively 
severe recessions. The available empirical evidence, however, 
only weakly supports the notion that the need for an income 
maintenance oriented FSB program is greater during reces 
sions.
Finally, even if the judgment is made that indicators sug 
gest a recession severe enough to warrant an FSB-type pro 
gram, there are good reasons for avoiding premature 
implementation. EB provides some breathing room: in 
dividuals who are just exhausting regular benefits when the 
recession begins can receive up to 13 weeks of added protec 
tion from EB; and those who are just being laid off at that 
time can collect as many as 39 weeks of benefits in all. There 
is thus sufficient time between the beginning of a recession 
and the time when its first "victims" would reach FSB to 
think carefully about whether and how FSB should be pro 
vided.
1. The earnings replacement rate is defined as the sum of UI benefits divided by after-tax 
earnings losses experienced over the entire period of unemployment.
2. The IUR rose about three points during the 1974-75 period so some small extension 
beyond EB would have been appropriate at that time.
Future Recessions 101 
C. What Should Be the Duration of an FSB Program?
The answer to this question is similar to that of the 
previous one. If the rationale for the program is primarily in 
surance against wage loss, UI durations should be increased 
about 3.5 to 5.1 weeks for every 1 percentage point rise in the 
insured unemployment rate above the level for which the EB 
program is considered satisfactory. A 3.5-week increase 
would maintain constant exhaustion rates and a 5.1-week in 
crease would maintain constant earnings replacement rates. 
Such actions would therefore provide UI recipients with 
similar protection during recessionary and nonrecessionary 
periods. This strategy implies that an FSB program would 
only be required during relatively severe recessions and, for 
most of these, the program need only be of relatively short 
duration. 3
Another rationale for an FSB program is a welfare one 
(i.e., to prevent a rise in the incidence of poverty), and it 
weakly supports a somewhat longer extension program. We 
showed in chapter V that existing welfare programs would 
not have provided an adequate substitute for FSB for low- 
income households and that there was some weak evidence 
that the incidence of poverty of UI exhaustees was greater 
during a recession. No guidance, however, was provided as 
to how long such a program should last. This is a policy deci 
sion and requires an assessment of the trade-off between the 
increased income support, target inefficiency, and increased 
work disincentives of UI extensions.
3. Perhaps the goals of FSB-type extensions could be achieved by having a variable number 
of weeks of EB benefits triggered more or less automatically in response to labor market 
conditions.
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D. Can the Disincentive Effects of UI Extensions 
Be Mitigated?
Evidence was presented in chapter IV showing that each 
additional week of potential FSB added at least . 1 weeks to 
the average duration of unemployment because of increased 
disincentives to take jobs. In the context of the 1974-75 
recession, this means that the FSB program added about 
one-half point to the national unemployment rate. Several 
suggestions have been proposed about ways in which these 
disincentives might be mitigated if a decision were made dur 
ing a future recession to institute an FSB-type program. For 
example, it may not be desirable merely to extend benefits 
for all EB exhaustees. Additional eligibility requirements 
might be considered to reduce the cost of extensions and to 
try to reduce the disincentive effects of the additional weeks 
of UI benefits by focusing extensions on those workers with 
a demonstrated strong work attachment. For example, one 
suggestion is to limit benefits to individuals who have 
evidence of substantial pre-layoff work experience. 4 Data 
from a simulation of the effects of several such policies on 
the characteristics of FSB recipients are presented in table 
VI. 1. These data focus on variables which may provide some 
indirect evidence of reduced work disincentive effects. The 
two demographic variables, sex and age, are used because 
disincentive effects may vary across such groups, being 
greater for females and for older individuals. The net weekly 
wage replacement rate is reported because of the positive ef 
fect of weekly wage replacement rates on unemployment 
duration. The proportion of recipients with a working 
spouse is reported because this variable may be positively
4. Another rationale for this restriction is that this group should be given greater insurance 
than individuals with little work experience and this already occurs in the variable duration 
states.
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related to disincentive effects, and finally, labor force status 
in March 1975 is reported as an indicator of post- 
unemployment labor force attachment. The data reported in 
Table VI. 1 show that each of the four simulated additional 
eligibility requirements would have reduced FSB caseloads 
and cost, but would have had little effect on any of the other 
reported variables and, presumably, little effect on disincen 
tives. Three of these potential eligibility screens required 
base period work experience for FSB in excess of that re 
quired for regular UI and the fourth screen does not permit 
individuals who had exhausted EB prior to the implementa 
tion of FSB to receive benefits. Because some of these latter 
individuals had relatively long gaps between EB exhaustion 
and FSB receipt, it was thought that the principal effect of 
FSB on their behavior was only to draw many of them back 
into the labor force in order to collect FSB benefits. In any 
event, eligibility screens based on work experience seem 
unlikely to reduce the disincentive effects of FSB.
A final simulated policy, whose results are reported in 
table VI. 1, was to subject FSB benefits to the federal income 
tax. The principal effect of this was to reduce the net weekly 
wage replacement ratio from 65 to 60 percent and to reduce 
the proportion of recipients with a replacement rate above 60 
percent from 52 to 42 percent. While in theory such a reduc 
tion might help mitigate the disincentive effect of increased 
duration, empirical tests of this effect with the FSB sample 
produced statistically insignificant results.
In addition to these policies that would restrict eligibility 
and benefits for FSB, one policy approach that might reduce 
the work disincentive effects of UI extensions would be to 
impose stronger job search and job acceptance requirements 
on these recipients. This approach was adopted, in fact, dur 
ing the latter part of the FSB program. Public Law 95-19,
TABLE VI.l
Simulated FSB Program and Recipient Characteristics Under 
Alternative FSB Eligibility Criteria and Application of the 
Federal Income Tax
Program Measure 
and Recipient 
Characteristic
Actual Experience
Under 1975
FSB Program
Alternative Eligibility Requirement8
30 Weeks in 
Base Year
_____ligi
40 Weeks in
Base Year
60 Weeks in 
3-Year Base
Subject Bene- 
Not in FSB fits to Fed. 
Backlog Income Tax
Caseload, as 
percentage of 
1975 program 100.0
Cost as percent 
age of 1975 
program costb 100.0
Mean Age 
(years) 38.9
Percentage male 52.5
Percentage of 
net wage re 
placed by UI
0-40 15.1% 
40-60 33.0 
60 and over 51.9 
Total 100.0% 
Mean 64.6
76.3
79.7
39.7
53.0
13.9% 
32.7 
53.4 
100.0% 
65.0
63.5
67.7
39.4
52.1
13.9% 
31.3 
54.8 
100.0% 
65.3
82.8
85.8
40.0
55.3
14.8% 
33.4 
51.8 
100.0% 
65.6
85.7
83.8
38.4
52.9
14.6% 
33.3 
52.1 
100.0% 
64.7
100.0
86.5
38.9
52.5
19.1% 
39.2 
41.7 
100.0% 
59.5
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enacted in April 1977, continued the FSB program and, 
among other provisions, required states to apply a uniform 
set of job search and job acceptance requirements instead of 
adopting the state requirements that otherwise applied. 
These federal requirements disqualified for the duration of 
their unemployment spell FSB claimants who (1) failed to ac 
cept suitable work; (2) failed to apply for suitable work to 
which they were referred by the state; or (3) failed to seek 
work actively. These requirements were generally more 
stringent than those in the regular state programs. 5
One analysis of the effect of these requirements found that 
they had a substantial effect on the level of disqualifications, 
increasing the total by 78 to 287 percent in selected states. 6 
Most of these disqualifications were for "not able to" or 
"not available for" work, but the rate for refusal of suitable 
work also rose. The effect varied by state, being smallest in 
those states with eligibility and disqualification provisions in 
the regular UI program similar to those imposed on FSB. 
Thus, stiff job search and job acceptance requirements for 
UI extensions raise the rate of disqualifications and poten 
tially may help mitigate the problem of work disincentives 
although the connection between disqualification and work 
disincentives, if any, is not well documented.
E. How Could FSB Benefits Be Targeted More 
Effectively on the Poor?
If a major goal of future extensions is to prevent increased 
poverty among UI exhaustees, we have shown in chapter V 
that it is inefficient to extend benefits to all exhaustees. Some
5. The definition of suitable work in this provision was broader than that used in the 
regular state programs, including, for example, low wage (i.e., minimum wage) jobs that 
would not usually be considered suitable for most claimants under the state laws.
6. These results were reported in Felder and West (1978) and Felder and Pozdena (1978).
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targeting of benefits to the poorest recipients may be 
desirable. The effect of several possible methods of doing 
this are reported in table VI.2. For each method, two 
measures of effectiveness are reported in addition to the im 
pact on cost and caseload: the net wage replacement ratio 
and the distribution of program benefits by recipients© 
poverty status. This distributional measure differs somewhat 
from the concept used in chapter V where the distribution of 
recipients by poverty status was reported. It was chosen to 
show exactly how FSB expenditures would have been 
distributed under the various policy options.
The first policy analyzed in table VI.2 is the restriction of 
FSB eligibility to recipients who, at the time of application, 
had a household income below the Bureau of Labor 
Statistic©s 1975 lower living standard (i.e., about 1.8 times 
the poverty line). This policy would have had only a small ef 
fect on wage replacement ratios but would have significantly 
changed the distribution of FSB benefits. Almost 90 percent 
of program benefits would, under this option, have been 
paid to recipients with annual incomes below two times the 
poverty line, compared with the 64 percent paid under the 
actual 1975 program. 7 A second policy option subjecting 
FSB benefits to the federal income tax would have reduced 
wage replacement ratios but would have had little effect on 
the distribution of after-tax benefits. The last two options, 
reducing the weekly UI benefit by 15 or 25 percent of the 
sum of the spouse©s earnings and the family©s rent, interest 
and dividend income, would have reduced wage replacement 
rates considerably and shifted the distribution of benefits to 
lower income households. However, this shifting would not
7. Because poverty measures are based on 1975 annual income but FSB eligibility is based 
on income at the time of FSB application, some individuals with 1975 household incomes 
above the lower living standard were still eligible for FSB.
TABLE VI.2
Actual FSB Program Experience and Simulated Experience 
Under Alternative Policy Options for Eligibility and 
Treatment of Benefits
Simulated Experience Under Policy Options
FSB Program 
Measure
Actual Experience 
Under 1975 
FSB Program
Household Income 
Eligibility-Below 
1975 Lower Living 
Standard8
FSB Benefits 
Subject to
Federal Income 
Tax
Weekly Benefit Reduction by 
Percent of 
Other Income
15 Percent 25 Percent
Recipients eligible 
as percentage of 
1975 program 100.0
Total cost as 
percentage of 
1975 program 100.0
Percentage distri 
bution of recip 
ients by ratio of 
weekly UI benefit 
to net wage
0-40 15.1% 
40-60 33.0 
60 and over 51.9
Total 100.0% 
Mean 64.6
69.4
70.2
100.0
86.51
97.0
85.5
16.9% 
35.3 
47.8 
100.0% 
62.3
19.1% 
39.2 
41.7 
100.0% 
59.5
30.1% 
36.9 
32.9 
100.0% 
52.6
89.6
78.7
34.8% 
33.8 
31.4 
100.0% 
50.3
o oo
•n
cS"
n>
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have been as large as that accomplished with the lower living 
standard income eligibility screen.
Choosing among these options is difficult because alloca- 
tional, distributional and administrative goals may be in con 
flict. The taxing option would be the easiest administratively 
because the UI system would not need to collect additional 
data (i.e., income data) to determine FSB eligibility, or to 
calculate payments as it would for the other options. 
However, this policy would not significantly affect the 
distribution of benefits. Of the other two types of policies, 
the income eligibility screen would probably be the easiest to 
administer because there would be no question of 
recalculating the benefit periodically (to account for changes 
in family income) and because precise measurement of in 
come would only be necessary for individuals near the 
eligibility cut-off. However, this absolute cut-off of benefits 
would create incentives for those with incomes above the cut 
off line to reduce the spouse's earnings to ensure UI eligibili 
ty. Despite this problem, use of an income eligibility screen 
appears to be the easiest and most effective way for FSB 
benefits to be targeted to the poor.
F. Can FSB-Type Programs Improve Job Search 
Outcomes?
Analysis of data from the FSB program showed that FSB 
recipients who ultimately became reemployed suffered a 
substantial loss in their real weekly earnings. Weekly wages 
on jobs held in November of 1977 (about three years after 
the initial layoff) were, on average, about 10 percent lower in 
real terms than weekly wages on the pre-UI job. This loss oc 
curred for both real hourly earnings, which declined about 3 
percent, and for hours worked, which declined about 6 per 
cent. This average loss masked considerable variation in in-
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dividual experiences; nearly one-third had jobs paying less 
(in real terms) than 75 percent of the pre-UI wage. Thus, 
there are good reasons to ask if these job search outcomes 
could be improved in future recessions.
Unfortunately, analysis of the reemployed FSB recipients' 
interview responses also provided little guidance for improv 
ing these outcomes. No evidence was found supporting the 
hypothesis that increased UI durations led to increased post- 
unemployment wages, and for men, services (such as 
counseling or job search assistance) provided by the Employ 
ment Service (ES) appeared to have had no effect. On the 
other hand, women who were similarly served by the ES were 
found to have gained higher weekly wages. For women's 
hourly wages, however, the effect was insignificant, sug 
gesting that the ES may have helped women obtain full-time 
rather than part-time jobs.
With regard to training and education, the analysis show 
ed that FSB recipient skill levels were roughly comparable to 
those of EB recipients. Hence, their long unemployment 
spells were probably due mainly to the high unemployment 
rates during the recession, rather than to a substantial lack of 
job skills. There was little evidence that those enrolled in 
education or training programs experienced substantial 
payoffs as a result of their participation. Consequently, the 
FSB experience sheds little light on the issue of whether 
training programs should play a role in future emergency ex 
tensions.
G. How Should Emergency Extended Benefits 
Programs Be Financed?
The FSB program was funded in two ways. Until April 
1977, costs were charged to the extended unemployment
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compensation account in the federal unemployment trust 
fund to which a portion of federal UI tax revenues is 
allocated. Following that date, the costs were charged to 
general revenues. The financing of future FSB programs 
should, in our view, continue to be from general revenues. 
This method of financing would treat FSB in the same way 
as other federal countercyclical programs and emphasize 
that severe national recessions are a federal responsibility. 
Such a method for financing extensions would result in costs 
being spread generally over the population rather than being 
charged to employers only.
That approach is consistent with the notion that long 
unemployment spells during a recession result from 
macroeconomic factors rather than from the decision pro 
cesses of firms. Although general revenue financing of FSB, 
rather than employer payroll tax financing, may lessen the 
incentive for firms to recall their own workers, we do not 
believe this is particularly important for the case of the long- 
term unemployed.
H. What Alternatives to FSB Are Available?
If, in the future, the nation is faced with a recession severe 
enough to warrant consideration of an FSB-type program, 
two alternative programs might also be considered. First, if 
the principal goal of an FSB-type program is income 
maintenance for the long term unemployed, then a program 
based on a household income eligibility test may be ap 
propriate. As we showed in chapter V, the current welfare 
programs would not provide an adequate income to most UI 
exhaustees because of categorical eligibility restrictions. But 
an expanded, more generous welfare system might alter that 
result.
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For example, we showed that the Carter Administration's 
1977 welfare reform plan would have halved the proportion 
of FSB recipients under the 1975 program with household in 
comes below one-half the poverty level. An FSB program 
would, in this case, have an additional antipoverty effect, 
but the income maintenance argument for FSB-type exten 
sions would be less strong than is presently the case. 8
A public service employment program (PSE) for UI ex- 
haustees might also be considered as a potential substitute 
for FSB extensions. While the choice between these two pro 
grams is partly one of congressional preference, several 
points in favor of FSB extensions can be raised. First, 
starting up a major PSE program would probably take 
longer, thus its impact might be delayed relative to that of 
FSB extensions. Second, phasing out a PSE program may be 
more difficult than phasing out an FSB program, particular 
ly since any time limit placed on PSE jobs is likely to be 
longer than any placed on FSB benefit extensions. Third, the 
cost of a PSE job slot is probably higher than the cost of FSB 
benefits paid to the individual, given that the value of output 
from PSE jobs may be low and given the relatively sizable 
rate of substitution for PSE jobs. 9 Fourth, any argument for 
PSE that emphasizes the training aspect of employment may 
not be particularly important for UI exhaustees because 
most already have substantial job experience and skills. And 
finally, it may not be possible to create PSE jobs on a scale 
that would equal the scale of FSB-type programs and any at 
tempt to do so would likely exacerbate the timing problems
8. Another alternative would be (as described in table VI.2) to apply some sort of reduction 
in benefits for a portion of other income. Income tested unemployment assistance was 
recommended by the National Commission on Unemployment Compensation (1980) p. 
172, although it also recommended FSB extensions.
9. For a discussion of these issues see Garfinkel and Palmer (1978), pages 6-11. "Substitu 
tion" occurs when PSE funds are used to finance ongoing local municipal employment 
rather than to create new jobs.
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mentioned above. Thus, in future recessions, PSE jobs are 
likely to be only a partial substitute for FSB extensions, if 
they are judged necessary at all.
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